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I am a man: little do I last 
and the night is enormous. 
But I look up: 
the stars write. 
Unknowing I understand,  
I too am written 
and at this very moment 
someone spells me out. 
    -Octavio Paz, Brotherhood: Homage to Claudius 
Ptolemy 
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The Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) had a multifaceted yet 
brief existence in comparison to its sister organization, the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization. Yet, as recent scholarship demonstrates, the 
organization can be usefully examined not only for its own sake, but to 
study broader issues in the Cold War in Southeast Asia, if not more 
expansively. Australian foreign policy in the Southeast Asian region in the 
Cold War period has, similarly, provided avenues for analysis but also 
remains fertile ground for exploring the policies of a power trying to find a 
greater voice in global affairs while balancing commitments to its 
traditional allies and expanding its engagement with newly decolonizing 
states. A study examining Australia’s involvement in SEATO in the most 
active years of the organization’s existence, 1954-1962, can bring to the 
fore and also problematize understandings of decolonization, ideological 
struggles intertwined with national aspirations, superpower conflict, and 
the pursuit of an Australian grand strategy objective. Australia 
consistently pursued the last element, but policymakers and planners at 
the highest levels did not only channel forward defence through SEATO. 
This thesis argues that Australia’s involvement in SEATO from 1954 
to 1962 can be considered as primarily involved in pursuing legitimacy as 
an objective. Legitimacy took two forms. One was political legitimacy, 
which meant emphasizing SEATO as a positive means to defend the 
integrity of independent territories in Southeast Asia, and communicating 
	 vi	
this to an audience at home as well as nations abroad, at times detracting 
from this view of benevolence. The second form of legitimacy was in 
regards to the military capability of SEATO and the commitment of 
military force by Australia, broadly, to it. This latter form meant 
guaranteeing that SEATO could deter or if necessary defeat threats from 
communist aggressors in the region. 
Legitimacy did not operate as a principle in a vacuum, and the fact 
that Australia had to engage with multilateral planning through SEATO 
meant consensus had to be maintained. This was problematic when its 
powerful allies, the United States (US) and the United Kingdom (UK), 
envisioned different roles for the organization, and their own involvement 
in the region, differently from its incipient stages. This did not paralyse 
the workings of the organization from the start. A serious effort was made 
to build the organization, in both political and military terms; but planning 
and assessment were subject to numerous changes on the ground. These 
changes eventually led to a growing emphasis on counter-subversion, 
which followed from an initial focus on direct overt communist invasion. 
While such an emphasis was reflected in planning, and while Australian 
efforts to make such plans credible were serious, a failure of consensus 
embodied through the neutralization of Laos, and the Rusk-Thanat 
agreement of March 1962, meant that Australia had to pursue other 
means to meet its objective of forward defence. SEATO’s loss of 
consensus did not spell a fait accompli in terms of compromising 
Australian strategic objectives. 
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In the years following the Second World War, Australian politicians and 
policymakers sought to engage constructively in world affairs through a 
variety of initiatives, which were in accordance with the ultimate goal of 
survival and security of the homeland.	Australian planners sought to  
manage their limited means and pursue security through a grand strategy  
of forward defence. This explains the involvement of Australia in 
numerous collective defence agreements and treaties, such as the 
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). Grand strategy can be 
encapsulated as an endeavour of policy: 
That is, in the capacity of the nation’s leaders to bring 
together all of the elements, both military and 
nonmilitary, for the preservation and enhancement of 
the nation’s long-term (that is in wartime and 
peacetime) best interests. It is…an art in the 
Clausewitzian sense — and a difficult art at that, since it 
operates at various levels, political, strategic, 
operational, tactical, all interacting with each other to 
advance or retard the primary aim.1  
 
Australia’s approach was developed in an environment transformed 
in many ways by the Cold War, and the extension of its ramifications 
through global conflicts subsumed by or related to the bipolar conflict 
between the United States and the Soviet Union. However, Australian 
interests were however not solely related to positioning itself in that 




United Kingdom and New Zealand, and with preserving ties with the 
Commonwealth. Balancing new responsibilities in an environment with 
altered global circumstances meant that managing traditional links 
became modified and complicated by the expansion of the Cold War into 
Asia, and more specifically Southeast Asia, after 1948. The experience, 
especially, of armed conflict in the region, with gradual but actual 
Australian involvement, was in Malaya. This conflict was rightly termed a 
“localised ‘hot war’” by Cheah Boon Kheng.2 Smaller conflicts not only 
modified the situation on the ground, but also embodied deeper forces 
such as ideology, nationalism, aspiration to sovereignty and the 
decolonization process. 
This thesis posits that Australia’s involvement in the organization 
that became SEATO- from its incipient stages as a developing consensus 
of powers to engage constructively in the region subsequent to the 
Geneva Agreements of 1954, to a body capable of deterring or if 
necessary defeating aggression of various forms to what became the 
“Treaty Area,” and to its eventual lack of action and consensus in 1962- 
was a constructive means to mitigate and manage the forces of ideology, 
nationalism, aspirations towards sovereignty and decolonization in 
Southeast Asia. Australia also sought an organization that could help it 
achieve its end of forward defence; but its involvement in the 
organization, as well as the organization itself, had to be “legitimate.” 





through SEATO, in two principal ways. First, legitimacy would need to 
embody political dimensions, which meant the organization appeared 
viable and constructive to genuine nationalist aspirations in the 
management of decolonization, as well as embracing Asian powers. It 
would also need to communicate political legitimacy to a domestic 
audience that wanted to safeguard traditional links but not become 
involved in conflicts that could appear as actions that suppressed genuine 
“Asian” aspirations towards freedom. Second, legitimacy would have to 
encompass military realities, and the management of the Australian 
armed forces contribution to both SEATO and the region, in the light of 
other pre-existing commitments and alliances, such as the Australia, New 
Zealand and Malaya strategic planning agreement (ANZAM) and the 
Australia, New Zealand and United States Security Treaty (ANZUS). To 
Australian planners, military legitimacy meant not just the use of their 
armed forces but also how they were used in Southeast Asia, and 
developing the military capabilities of SEATO to achieve the broader 
strategic objective of keeping the fight away from Australian shores. In 
short, it was a means to the end of forward defence. 
Two related concerns, this thesis will demonstrate, are arguably the 
most important factors in shaping, formulating and executing plans to 
meet the goal of forward defence through presenting SEATO as a 
legitimate means to do this. These are timing and overlaps. Timing and 
overlaps relate directly to the aims and aspirations of Australian 
politicians and policymakers. Timing meant getting information and 
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updates on other actors’ intentions and capabilities, as well as keeping up 
with the greater powers that became the most important military and 
diplomatic link to Australia: the UK and the US. Timing was also a way to 
manage change effectively, by trying to influence developments on the 
ground in Southeast Asia. Overlaps involved management of different 
capabilities in ways that efficiently marshalled resources in a pragmatic 
way to reinforce regional commitments and keep an eye on developing 
capabilities. Overlaps also allowed the management of personnel, and 
enabled Australian officials to link differing alliance and force 
commitments. 
The thesis will deal primarily with the period from 1954 to 1962, 
which encompassed SEATO’s most active years as a platform to plan the 
defence of the region. While other scholarly accounts focused on longer 
time periods, this thesis has chosen SEATO’s most active years, because 
this yields insights not just into the policies of a power looking to engage 
more actively in the Cold War after 1945, but also into the Cold War and 
its expansion into Southeast Asia. This was a time when space was 
constantly the object of contest, not just in terms of defining national 
identities and anticolonial wars of decolonization, but also in terms of how 
planners outside the region sought to define, categorize and deal with 
threats in the region. This yields insights into conflicts and tactics, but 
also how planning for scenarios that did not occur can still teach us a 
great deal about what actually did. In this sense, the numerous conflicts 
and configurations of sovereignty from 1954 to 1962 are worth examining 
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to understand a period that demonstrated the growing Cold War in the 
broader Asia-Pacific area, and expand our knowledge of regional defence 
in a time of nationalist aspirations. 
No single monograph has tried to deal with Australia’s role in SEATO 
between 1954 and 1962. This thesis employs a largely document-focused 
study of memoranda, correspondence, reports and speeches by Australian 
politicians and officials, relying on declassified documents available after 
the Cold War period. It employs an empirical approach to its survey of 
developments, but does not claim to present a full narrative of Australia 
in SEATO in those years. Instead, the approach revolves around the study 
of SEATO to understand Australian grand strategy in the period. Hence, 
the narrative offers an appraisal of these themes, and cannot by definition 
be a complete survey of Australian grand strategy in those years, or an 
appraisal of all the developments in SEATO in those years, or all the 
developments in global affairs in the time frame. The sheer volume of 
material is a reminder of how the historian of the Cold War, and especially 
one privileged to access the well-organized and collated materials of 
Australia, must be both cautious and judicious. In fact, volume should not 
be confused with analytical quality, though, of course, the materials tell 
the story. The empirical approach remains an important guide even as the 
field of the Cold War embraces new conceptual frontiers, and a document 
focused study that is also analytically rigorous can tell us new stories (for 
after all, we exist in Cleo’s shadow) that pose new questions about 




Since this study uses a primarily empirical approach, a discussion of 
methodologically similar works will open a review of extant literature. 
Empirical studies of the Cold War have helped us find new ways to read 
how things happened, and may shed positive or negative light on the 
policies pursued by superpowers or other actors, some of which focus on 
Southeast Asia.3 These expand our knowledge base and de-centre the 
Cold War from grand narratives of superpower conflict, because they 
amplify and shed light on the periphery. However, peripheral perspectives 
do not negate the need for a broader bipolar appreciation of the conflict. 
Studies on the Cold War in Asia and Southeast Asia are growing, not just 
political histories of regionalism but in the realm of culture too. 
When it comes to studies of Southeast Asia in the Cold War, the 
volume Cultures at War: the Cold War and Cultural Expression in 
Southeast Asia edited by Tony Day & Maya Liem, plus volumes by 
Malcolm Murfett, Albert Lau, Christopher Goscha & Christian Ostermann 
and others have brought this regional focus to the global conflict and its 
various manifestations, and charted new possibilities for scholars, by 
opening avenues for conversation and debate on a topic that was 
previously dealt with in terms of conflicts (Vietnam War) or country-






because it examines the cultural dimension of a conflict usually associated 
with geopolitics, but also has nuanced appraisals of how the lines between 
cultural expression overlapped, came into conflict with, and worked 
parallel to global and local politics. Day’s essay “Still Stuck in the Mud: 
Imagining World Literature During the Cold War in Indonesia and 
Vietnam”5 is worth examination. In the chapter, Day locates literature 
worlds in Southeast Asia that flowed with potential for future artistic 
possibilities, which “some might have said that the contours of a new 
world literary space were becoming visible from the Indonesian city of 
Bandung” where, in the view of one writer, Paris was the province, while 
Indonesia was the centre of the literary world he inhabited. Global artistic 
imaginations became repackaged and understood through the idiom of 
nationalism. This process of reimagining global links is central to “newer” 
possibilities of reading the Cold War in Southeast Asia, precisely because 
actors — be they novelists or diplomats, or reporters — gave meaning to, 
and derived meaning from, understandings of regionalism. 
These works coincide, but are not necessarily related, with 
scholarship on the Cold War now more commonly known in academic 
language as “the new Cold War,” which has revised older approaches to 
the Cold War. The older approaches can be seen as, broadly speaking, 
traditional studies on diplomatic history, the history of foreign policy, and 







military history.6 A very basic definition of this newer approach is that it is 
now multi-archival and multi-lingual, while also open to interdisciplinary 
and multicultural influences. John Lewis Gaddis in his influential book We 
Now Know laid out an important opening salvo in this direction. But he 
dedicates only one chapter to the newer possibilities for methodology and 
for most of the book criticizes Josef Stalin for starting the Cold War, based 
on new evidence.7 
While the role of Stalin is not insignificant in the debate on the 
origins of the conflict, the Cold War as a subject of academic inquiry has, 
as pointed out by recent articles by scholars such as Frederico Romero, 
expanded beyond this “interpretations” debate on the origins of the 
conflict.8 O.A. Westad, Christina Klein and Jeremi Suri, to name a few, 
have tried to expand traditional understandings of the conflict.9 Westad’s 
edited volume Reviewing the Cold War is a compilation of prominent 
historians’ essays on new directions in Cold War studies,10 but it preceded 
efforts of scholars such as Klein to read Cold War grand strategies such as 
containment as US policy as “structures of feeling,” by examining texts 












invention not merely of policymakers but also of those involved in 
creating a middlebrow imaginary.11 
In many ways, the traditional empirical method associated with 
studies on the Cold War is being adapted, not least by scholars trying to 
incorporate conceptual and cultural perspectives and ask how the Cold 
War was experienced. This point is expressed by Westad in the 
Cambridge History of the Cold War series, where he points out this new 
concern of scholarship.12 After all, the questions we ask of the past are 
often contemporary, and follow trends in broader historiographical and 
humanities scholarship. Heonik Kwon, an anthropologist, asked about the 
historiography on the end of the Cold War in his book The Other Cold War 
which suggested that current scholarship takes the year 1989 as a fait 
accompli as the end of the Cold War as a conflict, but instead argues that 
there was no such thing as the Cold War in the first place and seeks new 
possibilities to give voice to the global periphery.13 This is because the 
periphery can be read as a “death world” in which the conflict was most 
explicitly experienced in terms of casualties. While Kwon’s book is 
conceptually rich, it often misses the wood for the trees, preferring to 
critique thinkers such as Arjun Appadurai or Dipesh Chakrabarty in an 
extended survey without really exploring the idea of rescuing the 
memories of those who suffered from oblivion at the end of the 1980s. 







stimulating to a scholar delimiting his work chronologically as a period in 
the Cold War: perhaps these are too rigid lines imposed arbitrarily on an 
idea that suggests continuities which defy this formulation? What the new 
directions also suggest is a broadening of the scope of sources that can 
be used as a primary base for studies examining various aspects of the 
conflict. This relates to the shift away from a document source-based 
approach towards other bases. 
Historical writing on Australian involvement in Southeast Asia has 
tended to be structured around obligations in military conflicts, notable 
exceptions being Australia and Indonesian independence and the political 
fates of East Timor and West New Guinea.14 One could simplify conflicts to 
involvement in Malaya and Vietnam as the two major examples. Peter 
Edwards was appointed as the “Official Historian of Australia’s 
Involvement in Southeast Asian Conflicts” and this has turned into a nine-
volume series that deals with politics and includes specific studies on 
different “arms” of the armed forces. Of these, two volumes stand out to 
the reader more interested in grand strategy, diplomacy and politics, 
rather than operational histories: Crises and Commitments: the Politics 
and Diplomacy of Australia’s Involvement in Southeast Asian Conflicts 








Diplomacy During the Vietnam War 1965-1975.15 These are most relevant 
to this study, and will appeal to the non-specialist reader. They are useful 
resources, especially when searching for further avenues to explore, 
because they are specific to Australian regional commitments at the time. 
It is no exaggeration that dominant narratives on Australian foreign 
policy in the period are more focused on how policymakers developed 
their own approaches to the Cold War;16 but just because they do not 
deal explicitly with the region does not mean that the accounts of 
prominent politicians, the diplomatic service and the press are not 
helpful.17 The Cold War period was important in terms of shaping a 
national consciousness for Australia, complicating the relationship 
between the traditional allies in the US, UK, Commonwealth and Asian 
powers. While they gained political independence before the Second 
World War, the period that followed tested the vitality of prior links and 
affinities between these polities and their sponsors — most explicitly, the 
UK. Imperial legacies, pivots towards US security guarantees, and 
involvement in Southeast Asia, more controversially in Vietnam, all 














however, is “finding”: there is no such thing as the national voice; there 
are many types of voices that characterize this, and this panoply invites a 
nuanced appraisal of its various articulations and manifestations. The 
extensive literature that deals with domestic politics is complemented by 
various comparative studies of foreign policy, one of which is Ronald 
Frankum Jr.’s work on Australia and the US and Vietnam, titled Silent 
Partners.18 Emphasizing the interdependence between US policy and 
Australian presence in the conflict, Frankum demonstrates how the 
notions of asymmetry usually associated with coalition warfare need to be 
more nuanced when approaching this particular relationship. 
The focus of Australian writing on Vietnam merits attention, but 
more importantly alludes to the impact of Vietnam on Australian society, 
and its importance in the modern history of the nation. Unfortunately, 
however, most attention on this conflict obscures the focus on interaction 
and involvement in Southeast Asia otherwise, of which Vietnam is an 
important yet protracted part.19 This thesis seeks to address this, by 
telling the story of Australia in SEATO after the First Indochina War. 
Finally, scholarly accounts on SEATO have been few and have 
tended to focus mainly on the effectiveness of the organization as a whole, 
in a broader debate over its salience as a significant force for deterrence 








Strategy is titled tellingly and focuses on the reasons for the 
organization’s ineffectiveness.20 Damien Fenton’s monograph To Cage the 
Red Dragon: SEATO and the Defence of Southeast Asia 1955-1965 is a 
recent rejoinder to the debate,21 using archival material declassified after 
the Cold War period to argue that the organization could indeed deter, 
and if not defeat, aggression in the years he chose to focus on. Other 
scholarly works incorporate SEATO into broader studies of regional 
concerns, but apart from Mark Pearson’s work on New Zealand’s role in 
the organization,22 one is pressed to find a significant account of a 
national involvement in SEATO, especially if one wishes to consult a study 




Chapter 1 examines the role of Australia in the world after 1945 and its 
engagement with alliances as a way to advance its strategic interests in 
Southeast Asia and more broadly. It evaluates Australian involvement in 
the establishment of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization in the initial 
years of its existence. It shows how Australian officials were concerned 
with managing change in Southeast Asia by developing a “legitimate” 








Chapter 2 discusses the years 1956 to 1959 and the development of 
SEATO into a “legitimate” deterrent, and demonstrates that while 
Australian planners sought to align their interests with the organization 
and its development, broader problems of consensus hindered but did not 
fatally cripple the ability of SEATO to meet threats. 
Chapter 3 looks at the growing problems of finding a consensus in 
SEATO, culminating in the failure to implement Plan 5 and the 
neutralization of Laos, and how SEATO became a necessary but 
insufficient platform for Australia to pursue its grand strategy. In this 
respect, Australian grand strategy used SEATO as a means, but it was not 
the only means, and so its strategic imperatives were not radically altered 















Chapter 1: Australia and the Formation of SEATO 
 
This chapter discusses the role of Australia in the Southeast Asia Treaty 
Organization (SEATO) from 1954 to 1956. These were the formative years 
of the organization, when its apparatus was created in terms of both the 
development of a treaty text following an agreement to collective defence, 
and the processes that determined the nature and scope of the articles in 
the text. In addition, the apparatus refers to the nascent but not 
insignificant structure of the organization, its development of a 
headquarters in Bangkok, and the relevant political, military and social 
components formalized in this period. This was a time of intense activity 
for the organization and its members. 
Australia’s role in this period marked a serious and sustained 
engagement with the development of the organization, concerned with 
two related notions of legitimacy — one which meant that SEATO could be 
both morally and politically well founded; the other that its military 
organization could be credible to both friends and foes. Neither of these 
was a fait accompli, but instead evolved through contingent processes. 
Neither Australian grand strategy, nor SEATO’s goals, was a fixed reality 
at this time. 
The pace of events was to dictate the ability of Australian, no less 
than other, officials to influence and perhaps shape the developments in 
SEATO’s formation. This gives rise to a theme that will play out in this 
chapter, that of the importance of timeliness, not just being abreast of 
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but acting with the information provided and communicated at particular 
junctures. This is relevant in forwarding the agenda of a middle power, 
looking for a way to mitigate concerns over great power security 
guarantees alongside the imperative to engage productively with Asian 
and Commonwealth partners. Thus, the appearance of timeliness need 
not be confined to memorandums, and conduct of diplomatic and defence 
officials, but extended to such conduct in broader, sometimes public 
forums. 
Similarly, with its limited resources and growing international 
responsibilities on a collective basis, Australia had to marshal military and 
other resources in an effective way, requiring caution, but not excluding 
the possibility of making greater contributions to fulfil ambitious Cold War 
obligations. This attempt at pragmatic yet determined management 
meant overlaps, and this will be examined in terms of how these overlaps 
came to be formulated, and what issues they raised. The actions of 
Australia in these years were contextualized broadly by those of others, 
so a study such as this must consider the broader international 
environment of the Cold War, and trace how Australia tried to enhance 
security, primarily, national security, by charting a course in, and 
responding to, events and situations associated with ideological conflict — 
and, importantly, its spread into Asia and the Pacific. 
As will be shown, a focus by Australia on conflicts in Southeast Asia 
was not necessarily a given, even though geographical proximity may 
make this appear so at the end of the Second World War. Similarly, a 
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foreign policy apparatus in development meant that decisions were often 
as much a result of individual players and responses to events as they 
were grounded in national principles. Australia established its first 
overseas diplomatic missions, other than to the UK, only in 1940.23 Finally, 
the decision to engage in collective security arrangements such as the 
Canberra Pact, the Australia, New Zealand and United States Security 
Treaty (ANZUS), the Australia, New Zealand and Malaya plan (ANZAM) 
and SEATO, does not intimate a policy that emphasized multilateral 
arrangements from the start. 
Alliances are often more than the sum of their parts. This chapter 
will lay out the argument that Australia’s engagement with SEATO in the 
incipient stages of the organization from pact to structure was one of 
proactive engagement, in trying to balance its relationships with primarily 
the US and the UK, as well as other, but select, Asian and Commonwealth 
states. The dynamic that this presented was that these relationships 
would need to be structured around two major themes — assistance and 
deterrence. The complicating factor is the different readings of the 
balance between the two, not least through organizations such as SEATO. 
SEATO provides not merely an apt metaphor but a direct demonstration 
of an organization that tried to present a deterrent but also assist in 
developing the principle of freedom and governments aspiring to it. This 




became one of the key issues faced by the organization in the years that 
followed. 
Australia, during the Second World War and immediately after, was 
strongly linked to the UK, not least through imperial defence and 
associations such as the Sterling Area. The Sterling Area saw the 
development of a system of imperial preference, where the UK “gave 
preference to the agricultural products of the dominions in return for 
which the dominions replaced some of the industrial goods they brought 
from foreign countries with British goods”.24 While Australian relations 
with the UK may have fluctuated due to events such as the Fall of 
Singapore, it should not be assumed that the Australians “would stand by 
and allow Britain to face the German onslaught alone.”25 This meant that 
although Australia had growing autonomy in the interwar years, Prime 
Minister Robert Menzies could still declare war without consulting either 
parliament or Cabinet. The only form of parliamentary contention at the 
start of the Second World War was concerned with how to meet local 
defence obligations in the broader overall constellation of imperial defence. 
Thus, the issue was about allocation of materiel and personnel in the face 
of a defence guarantee, given the possibility of British inability to 
implement the Singapore strategy; set against sending troops outside 
Australia. Thus, the debate in the early stages of the war did not concern 






resources to meet the aggressor and defend the realm. This meant being 
a partner taking direction from the UK in terms of overall war strategy. 
Australia involved itself, as Jeffrey Grey notes, between Poland and 
Pearl Harbor in a manner that can be described as “steady but unhurried.” 
Force contributions to campaigns in the early stages to the Mediterranean 
reaped experience and successes. While the years from 1941 ushered in 
divergences and disagreements between Australian military evaluations 
and British assessments, Australian involvement in Greece accumulated 
experience fighting both Germans and Italians (among other forces), but 
importantly, prepared it to meet a possible challenge by the Japanese. 
The events that unfolded, especially with the Japanese thrust southward 
rather than northward, included the embargo on Japanese oil supplies 
which led to an advance on the Netherlands East Indies. What the shift in 
focus towards the Pacific demonstrated was not the lack of intent by 
London to come to the aid of its peripheral partner, but its inability to do 
so because of other pressing concerns.26 
This inability, and the underpinning weakness of the strategy that 
led to it, can be seen in what is known as the Singapore strategy, which 
“always depended on the situation in Europe being under control.”27 As 
Farrell puts it: 
“The ‘Singapore strategy’ was not in fact a realistic grand strategy 
for war against Japan. It was an optimistic plan to shift the main fleet to 





about how it might wage war if it arrived intact. All overlooked the fatal 
flaw: the base would not be large enough to support a fleet strong 
enough to pursue any plans for a Phase II and III, even if one was 
sent.”28 
In February 1942, events exposed the flaw in the strategy. This not 
least undermined faith in the British guarantee to secure Australia, but 
also reinforced the need to protect Australia’s shores against the threat of 
Japanese invasion. This marked a shift to Australia devoting “almost all 
her attention and energies to the war against Japan”. While MacArthur 
refused to allow the Australian divisions to operate as a single corps 
under its own commander, and did not appoint senior Australian officers 
to his staff, this was less a demonstration of Australian ability than it was 
a reflection of other wartime priorities. Australia had a naval guarantee 
subsequent to the Coral Sea battle in 1942 by the US, and on the ground, 
Australia inflicted “on Japan her first ground defeat of the war” in Papua 
and New Guinea. While the skill and determination of the Australians did 
not change the course of the war, the experience of combat and the effect 
of Japanese shelling of Sydney and Newcastle, as well as the bombing of 
Darwin, underlined the importance of securing the Australian homeland 
after the war.29 
Amry and Mary Vandenbosch claimed, in their 1967 study of the 
engagement of Australia with the Southeast Asian region, that the Fall of 





turn to the US for support, and it “generally moved steadily closer to the 
United States, supporting United States and Pacific policies to the point of 
committing combat troops to Vietnam.” This was in part due to concerns 
over security that Australia was “a western people living in an unstable 
Asian region.” This had more to do with prospects of a Chinese advance 
into Southeast Asia.30 They are right to point out the fears over the 
security, as well as its potential source(s), but seem to embrace the idea 
that a shift to the US had its roots from 1942. This seems less convincing. 
It also serves as an instructive entry point into tracing how Australia 
engaged the region and more broadly with powers such as the UK, the US 
and emerging Asian nations. But a reasonable understanding of middle 
power status lends itself to a more sophisticated reading of Australian 
efforts in the postwar period. Garfield Barwick, speaking in 1964, tried to 
trace the meaning of “middle power” and what it described when talking 
about the Australian case: “It has common interests with both the 
advanced and underdeveloped countries … it has a European background 
and is set in intimate geographical propinquity to Asia.”31 
The ANZAC Pact, or Canberra Pact, marked an important moment in 
the growth of an ambitious Australian aspiration to have a voice in the 
world after the Second World War. It emphasized two key factors. First, 
actions by individuals in government rather than broad collectives often 






least by ministers such as H.V. Evatt, to whom it was important not only 
to associate with the structures of a postwar international system, best 
represented by the United Nations, but also to influence it on the regional 
level, in the form of defence and other links. From this perspective, it is 
not surprising to trace an Australian role in collective security in the 
postwar world. But this did not mean that engagement in any collective 
security structure was a given in the Cold War years. Second, the pact 
gave an incipient shape to Australian intentions to engage in regional 
“policing”, a term used in the agreements. The pact signalled a growing 
interest in regional responsibilities, but was more an aspiration than a 
documented change in overall policy. 
Evatt’s role in forging the Canberra Pact was extended into 1945 
when he outlined the dual roles through the UN Organization of fostering 
peace by encouraging “political, social and economic development, but 
also by providing military security”. This was important not just for the 
faith he placed in the institution of the UN but also how the organization 
would be a way for Australia to play a role in global security. In 1946, 
then PM Ben Chifley “issued a directive to the departments of Defence 
and External Affairs on the basis of their planning for Australia’s defence 
and national security”, which was to be undertaken under the auspices of 
the “the United Nations, British Commonwealth defence, and local defence, 





Chifley administration, were qualified by the realities of the postwar 
situation, and the presence (perhaps persistence) of historical links which  
constrained their ability to be more autonomous in policymaking. This did 
not mean the Australians altogether agreed with the British, even as 
Labour in the UK was in charge, and they diverged importantly on 
regional security. While the UK wished to pursue a “centrally co-ordinated 
system of Commonwealth defence,” the Australians preferred a 
decentralized approach. The memories of wartime failure in Singapore, 
with the prospect of a new threat from Japan, contoured this approach. 
When it came to Southeast Asia, however, they found consensus relating 
to the potential to develop markets in the region. 
Australian aspirations in the UN might have continued well into the 
future, but the realities of the veto, being in the hands of the permanent 
members of the Security Council and possibly stifling action based on 
their interests, certainly made this problematic. Similarly, Australia had to 
temper aspirations towards regional defence away from the UK’s broader 
vision of Commonwealth cooperation, in the person of Frederick Shedden. 
Secretary to Department of Defence, Shedden felt that Australia should 
continue to align its policies with the UK and into 1947 Australia’s Chiefs 
of Staff found a similar tone in stating the importance of Commonwealth 
defence cooperation; reliance “upon the United Nations for security” 
would be insufficient as there was yet no proof to substantiate such 




the Cold War, and Australian policymaking within it, and this meant trying 
to manage the overarching problem of securing the nation while 
maintaining collective security obligations. 
Parallel to commitments to defence, the Sterling Area provided 
opportunities as well as issues for security. Security can come to describe 
an economic concept too. Lee takes this further by suggesting that 
Australia in the postwar years undertook a “search for security which 
embraced the economic well-being of the country as well as its politico-
strategic security”. Interestingly, Lee suggests that while current 
scholarship on Australian foreign policy may indicate a shift closer to the 
US, in fact, “Australia moved closer to the United Kingdom,” not least due 
to the Sterling Area. Nonetheless, Lee takes the view that the period was 
“essentially a dialogue with Great Britain and the United States”.34 While 
the notion of such a dialogue is important, this should not exclude the 
interest Australia took in dialogue with smaller and emerging powers, for 
example its work on Indonesian independence, discussed below. 
Multilateralism in the form of international organizations and principles 
was promising, but the US did not seem interested in pursuing this 
towards a broader objective of international economic reconstruction. 
Thus, by 1947, the incumbent Labor administration had to move towards 
strengthening its association with the UK in economic terms. Australia in 
the wake of war had to pursue stability policies. In economic terms after 




promote intra-sterling area trade, and to develop Australia’s economy 
with British and Australian capital.”35 
Meanwhile, the UK tried to manage the effects of wartime economic 
stresses, which meant accepting Marshall Plan aid, while maintaining 
some form of Sterling Area vision. One example in 1947 entailed the 
formation of a “Sterling autarky including the colonies, Australia, New 
Zealand and possibly Denmark”. The problem was really the reluctance of 
the US to bolster the Sterling Area as a whole with Marshall aid dollars. 
Australia and New Zealand were technically allowed to convert unlimited 
amounts of sterling into dollars. While drawing from this dollar pool in the 
Sterling Area would reduce Britain’s basic reserve, Australia made a case 
to do this as “the bulk of their exports of primary products was going to 
the United Kingdom and could not easily be diverted to North America to 
earn dollars”36 
For Australia, an organizing principle other than the simple fact of 
geographical proximity to Southeast Asia was the need to protect itself 
from potential or actual threats arising from events in or from the region. 
Proximity does not mean only a sense of contiguity, but can also appear 
in the form of links such as the global emergence of communist ideology. 
This should not suggest that Australia or Australians were alien to such an 
ideology before the Second World War; in fact, as demonstrated by the 






the pact between the Russians and the Germans during the war, this was 
not the case. The Cold War years brought the communist threat to a 
global superpower level and this had local implications, some of which 
threatened to become entangled in labour movements, Asian aspirations 
and threats to national security. 
This could be seen in September 1945, when the Australian 
Communist Party issued a circular on Sydney wharves that warned 
workers and others of ships being loaded with supplies for the Dutch 
Army, “with the purpose of waging war against the independence of the 
Indonesian people … to assist the Dutch in any way is to assist avaricious 
Dutch imperialism against Indonesian democracy.”37  One should not 
exaggerate the impact of such sentiments, as the broader Australian 
public “had little understanding or sympathy for the Indonesians.” While 
the communist-led waterside workers could ban Dutch shipping, the 
government was careful not to advocate this as policy. This allowed 
Australia to encourage legitimate nationalist aspirations, while rejecting 
undue stresses to its relations with other parties. This approach was 
pragmatic, and the republican leadership nominated Australia to 
represent Indonesia on the UN Good Offices Committee, where it 
advocated, through people such as T.K. Critchley, the aspirations of 




even though there was “strong criticism from the Parliamentary 
Opposition for failing to support a ‘white’ ally in the region.”38 
This support was neither unequivocal, nor did it usher in a forgone 
conclusion of supporting nationalist movements in Southeast Asia, as 
would be seen in the complex diplomacy surrounding claims by Indonesia 
itself, in the following years, over New Guinea. The roles of leadership, 
nationalism and sovereignty were complex and could not be static in a 
rapidly changing Cold War dynamic. The change in government in 
Australia in 1949 brought in change in the form of a Liberal-Country party 
coalition that was initially more supportive of Dutch claims than Labor’s 
more forceful advocacy of nationalist claims; but this did not mean that 
the coalition departed from the broad vision established by Australia to 
deal with the postwar world. As Margaret George puts it in terms of 
evaluating the Australian government’s approach overall to the 
Indonesian independence issue, “although the Australian government 
officially prized itself as the articulator and protector of the Republic, its 
support was qualified and its diplomatic record not one of dependability or 
effectiveness. It did not always respond to the Republic’s requests for 
support or assistance, nor did it always give the Republic the kind of 
support that it most needed, or at the times when needed.” This was not 
least due to inconsistency and lack of coordination among government 




Cabinet or his Prime Minister.39 Australian governments from 1950 
emphasized the importance of engaging with Asia through the key 
initiative of the Colombo Plan (sometimes dubbed the Spender plan due 
to the initiatives by Percy Spender in the efforts). Through the plan, 
“Australian technicians went into many parts of Southeast Asia on aid 
projects”. Engaging Asian nations, Australia became a principal sponsor of 
the Plan and this led to an increase in trade, engagement between 
communities in South and South East Asia and Australians, and increased 
tourism by Australians to the Southeast Asian region.40 
The growing consensus between Defence and External affairs, 
despite their differences, on a shift in emphasis of Australia’s priorities to 
the Southeast Asian region from the Middle East, was marked also by a 
shift in the nature of the threat into the Asian continent. While earlier 
conflicts in Malaya gave an impetus to Australian involvement via its 
obligations, the rise of a new People’s Republic of China, the advent of the 
Korean War, and the growth of the communist threat in mainland and 
insular Southeast Asia meant that contingency and events directed the 
change in the nature of Australian focus. This did not necessarily mean an 
abandonment of aims developed prior to 1949, but a new government 
focused on combating communism at home and abroad had to contend 
with the pace of events that would come to dictate the direction of 






As the Cold War came to spread ideological, and actual, conflicts 
into Southeast Asia, it became intertwined with the processes of 
decolonization, and the nationalist aspirations surrounding this. On 7 April 
1954 Minister for External Affairs Richard Casey spoke in Parliament, 
giving his first major statement on the crisis in Indochina. That same day, 
the Australian High Commission in London cabled Canberra telling of 
British advice of a dilemma that would come to bear upon the actors in 
our narrative: the provision of American military aid should be 
encouraged but any more “dangerous form of United States involvement” 
was not. Casey had to balance the line in accordance with this for 
Australia. He told parliament that Indochina was to be “important for the 
security of the whole free world”. If it fell, Malaya might fall to the 
communists.41  
Labor, in opposition, echoed prior concerns over just how force 
would be used and under what aegis, but this did not substantially alter 
the Australian conviction or plans to involve itself actively in the situation. 
Evatt stood in response, making a plea for UN intervention into the 
situation, because Casey pointed to difficulties in referring the matter to 
the UN. Evatt, though, agreed with Casey, that if Indochina became 
communist it would be “the end of self government for the people,”42 but 
wished for the states to be brought into a commonwealth arrangement 





this speech, highlighted the importance of timeliness — even as Casey 
suggested the monsoon might bring a respite to the situation. 
The same day, give or take time difference, Dwight D. Eisenhower 
spoke of dominoes falling, and pre-empting as a form of action in 
Indochina. How to deal with this would play out in ways of fundamental 
importance to the defence of Australia, because it would pave the road to 
contributing to means, multilateral or otherwise, to advance the end of 
forward defence. Australian efforts to engage in the international 
community had already made its presence clear in collectives such as 
ANZUS and ANZAM. SEATO provided the opportunity to draw in the 
support of its powerful friends while managing Asian relations, though its 
formation was far from a forgone conclusion. The Australians would play 
an active role in developing the organization from its inception. But this 
meant it needed to tie together obligations with means, managing in the 
best possible way a commitment to defending itself by using resources to 
deter conflict in what would come to be termed the treaty area. 
Leicester C. Webb describes Australia’s role in the conclusion of the 
South East Asia Collective Defence Treaty (SEACDT) as “the first attempt 
by an Australian government to play a major and independent part in 
international politics … they [also] illustrate the possibilities and 
limitations created for her diplomacy by her position as a secondary 
European power adjacent to South-East Asia.”43 This is a valid 




awkward, Australia, while balancing commitments and creating new 
responsibilities, was active and not merely reactive. This is not to say that 
Australia took on a leadership role or that it did not need to rely on its 
commitments to its two major allies, but to demonstrate the energy with 
which politicians and planners transformed a collective defence network in 
Southeast Asia from vision to reality. Australia’s commitments prior to 
SEATO were important, but they did not cover the scope of the region as 
comprehensively. ANZUS addressed the Southwest Pacific, and ANZAM 
addressed Malaya, but SEATO matched the regional aspirations of a 
continental NATO, in its own way. This distinction is important, and has 
been convincingly addressed by Fenton in regards to the negative review 
SEATO has received compared to its European counterpart. That NATO 
was not activated until after the Cold War and SEATO disbanded during 
the global conflict is not reason enough to dismiss SEATO’s work.44 SEATO 
had a unique place in Australian foreign policy after the Second World 
War, tying together military imperatives with the desire to project a vision 
of benevolence through aid schemes such as the Colombo Plan. It gave 
expression to a sense of legitimate deterrence, and contributed to a 
growing appreciation of limits to the conduct to war and expansion of the 
understanding of deterrence. The key element here, that would come to 
bear on Australian planners, is subversion from either within or without. 
Australian grand strategy, in the form of forward defence, came to 




with agreements from Geneva onwards. The treaty negotiations that led 
to the formation of a South East Asia Treaty Organization were ushered in 
by the process of dialogue and discussion among the principal actors in 
Manila, in the latter half of 1954. Following the Geneva conference, in 
September 1954, Australian diplomats and ministers tried to engage 
seriously the processes that would establish the organization. In a note 
written for the purpose of consultation by the Acting Minister for External 
Affairs, the “action” article of the organization introduced the nature and 
scope of the security commitment, and the idea of collective security in a 
consultative framework in the event of the threat of aggression in the 
treaty area.45 
But the action article was not the same as the massive retaliation 
enshrined in its Atlantic counterpart. The same note, under the heading 
“Advantages in SEATO Treaty,”46 discussed how it would benefit Australia 
to secure a definite American commitment against communist aggression 
in Southeast Asia. It also appraised communist subversion as the main 
threat to Australian security in the Associated States (Cambodia, Laos, 
South Vietnam), Thailand and Malaya. While the first priority would be to 
secure American participation, the guarantee of the Asian signatories 
would be a safeguard against communist subversion. 
A general appreciation in the note was that the treaty was 
favourable to Australian strategic imperatives. Three areas identified as 





charter of the UN; that it was defensive and not aggressive; and that it 
did not offend the Asians. Also, the economic clause was identified as 
“permissive” in nature and did not involve formal commitments. Here it 
was clear that the organization could serve as a legitimate structure to 
defend Southeast Asia without requiring Australia to present itself in a 
position of belligerence.47 
For Australia, the military planning machinery was of utmost 
importance, which meant SEATO gave expression not just to direct 
military intervention and response, but also to deterrence to counter 
threats of a more complex nature.48 It also formalized the growing 
coordination between Defence and External Affairs towards a more 
regional focus, subsequent to the change in the nature of defence 
commitments in the Middle East. While planners saw that it might be 
useful to have a specific military commitment for treaty signatories to 
coordinate their military planning, this was unacceptable to the US. Casey, 
about to leave for the conference, put it clearly that, to involve the big 
powers in planning to defend the Southeast Asian area, “we in Australia 
realize very well that you can’t get something from nothing”.49 US 
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles made it clear that he was willing to 
discuss such plans with the UK, Australia, and New Zealand but not with 








Any such commitment could jeopardize the standing of nations if it 
did not work out, or if enemies could exploit such negotiations to further 
their own Cold War aims, broadly speaking. The US was concerned with 
secrecy before discussing such a force commitment. While the documents 
indicate that Australian delegates had secured a specific reference to 
military planning in Article 5 of the treaty, they noted with caution that it 
was unclear about the scope of such planning. They found that “we now 
have to work out with the Americans and the United Kingdom and New 
Zealand how these four powers can concert their planning.”50 Similarly, 
the issue of aggression and its definition preoccupied the signatories, not 
least because the US had signed a special reservation stating that it 
would accept the point of aggression only if it was communist in nature, 
and in contrast, the UK, Pakistan and possibly France would not have 
signed with the word included.51 
Australia was thus caught between a rock and a hard place. 
Australian planners indicated that more time should have been set aside 
during negotiations to discuss the inclusion of the term communist. Dulles 
was clear that Senate approval would be difficult to obtain if the threat or 
the response to such a threat was pursued in circumstances that did not 
endanger US security. Richard Casey saw that Australia would have to 
follow a policy that did not risk forfeiting US confidence in Canberra. While 





Australian representatives evaluated areas where they might face non-
communist aggression, within the treaty area.52 
Four likely sources of non-communist aggression-linked conflict 
were identified — fighting between India and Pakistan, between Burma 
and Thailand, and aggression by Indonesia or Japan. The threats can be 
evaluated as follows: the first was most likely but Casey told Pakistan 
Foreign Minister Zafrullah Khan that the Australians did not see the treaty 
coming into effect in the Indian subcontinent; hostilities between Burma 
and Thailand were not likely for the moment, and if border issues 
surfaced, they would not likely constitute SEATO understanding of 
aggression; in the case of possible aggression by non-communist 
Indonesia in Dutch New Guinea no automatic action would be undertaken 
under Article 4 (1) in the treaty as the Netherlands was not a party to 
SEATO. In a hand-written note, it was added to the document that 
“ANZUS applies to non-communist aggression by Indonesia against 
Australia”, but it was also stated that Indonesian aggression against other 
territories in the area would be covered under Article 4 (1). Finally, on 
Japan, the provisions of ANZUS would cover any such threat.53 
 Australia needed to find a balance between conflicts where it was 
willing to intervene and those where it could not sensibly do so. 
Policymakers were careful to note that Pakistan should be informed, in 





bound under SEATO to intervene.54 While the US had a provision under 
the treaty to act only in the event of specific threats that could be 
constituted as communist aggression, it was considering drafting a treaty 
text as strong as the NATO guarantee for Europe. When Dulles was asked 
in a press conference about a warning by Menzies to the Australian people  
about possible military support to defend both the Southwest Pacific and 
Southeast Asia more broadly, through SEATO as an instrument, his reply 
was cautious, indicating that he could not commit to a response before 
the Manila conference. When asked about the possible “economic and 
subversion angles,” Dulles responded that such penetration should be 
discussed among the powers — but need not be pursued by SEATO itself, 
because of prior agreements between states. Referring to similar earlier 
treaties like the Colombo Plan, Dulles said there could be either a single 
treaty with two parts, or two treaties with different membership, or 
informal arrangements with an economic character. Thus, a number of 
permutations were identified ahead of the Manila meeting.55 
The UK, ever cautious and wishing to manage decolonization while 
maintaining relationships with nationalist leaders, was interested in 
deterring communism but also making SEATO look politically legitimate 
by incorporating Asian opinion. Where doubts arose among Asian 
nationalist leaders such as Jawaharlal Nehru, the UK establishment tried 







In a letter to Nehru on 25 September 1954, Anthony Eden was quick to 
suggest that Nehru should not give rise to apprehensions and 
misunderstanding of the nature and scope of the SEATO treaty. The 
divergence in approach between the former colony and colonizer was “a 
difference not of objectives but of methods”.56 
While noting the “already evident” prospect of China’s good faith in 
the face of the Geneva settlement, Eden wrote that experience had shown 
that such assurances by communist powers could not be trusted without 
additional safeguards. Apprehensions were noted in the face of Mao 
Zedong’s statement that as the result of a two-camp global order in the 
Cold War “neutrality is no more than a word with which to delude people.” 
Such statements were backed up by hard facts on the ground, especially 
in the case of China’s behaviour in Korea and Laos. This also meant 
managing the idea of incorporating the Associated States into the 
organization, technically before elections in key areas such as South 
Vietnam, scheduled for 1956, though the UK wanted to make it clear that 
collective security was not an attempt to meddle in the affairs of these 
states. 
While Eden, in the spirit of caution characteristic of postwar British 
planning, indicated a desire to avoid policy miscalculation that might lead 
to war, he made it clear that the need to defend the ideals the UK, and 
others, stood for through force could not be disregarded. The UK’s role in 





East and Asia. The UK was by no means yet a postcolonial power, and 
was in the process of preparing colonies for independence, which was in 
David Goldsworthy’s view, a piecemeal process.57 
Australia, while wanting to encourage a more substantive military 
organization and emphasize “teeth,” also placed importance on keeping 
these plans secret, not only against possible infiltration by the enemy, but 
also to deter internal failings as well. This was reflected, not least, in 
concerns among broadly Western powers over the reliability of the Asian 
parties. Australian planners were concerned that the Philippines would act, 
based on a quoted report in the Sydney Morning Herald, in a way that 
might deter Dulles from attending the Manila conference. This was 
because the Philippines was expected to surprise the conference by 
asking for more “teeth” in the SEATO organization. Australia should not 
be seen to support this position, as it was important to establish a tactful 
approach that was more inclusive, while talk of military strength might 
compromise such a position.58 
The Australians appreciated the American security guarantee, and 
wished to impress upon the US the need to commit effective resources to 
defend Australia. When Australian representatives met the US 
ambassador, they met a solid “no” to the idea of a treaty that resembled 
NATO,59 as US commitment to ground forces would not likely draw public 







defence of Malaya and Thailand, to the table, US Ambassador to the 
Philippines Raymond Spruance was consulted. Australian representatives 
made it clear: the link between a SEATO with teeth and force 
contributions to be consulted and consolidated would revolve around a 
strategic area stemming from the Kra Isthmus in Thailand.60 
Similarly, it was reported that the US rejected Eden’s suggestion to 
redraft Article 4 of the treaty to make it resemble the NATO text more 
closely. Alan Watt reported the worrisome news that the US might 
imagine the SEATO treaty to be not much more than political in nature. 
Watt would, in the making of the treaty text, suggest that Spender 
pressure Dulles before the latter proceeded to Manila. Four areas were 
suggested: 
— Urgent need to build confidence among non-communists in the 
area; 
— Serious effect if the Manila Treaty was so general and vague as 
to be open to communist claims that it was worthless; 
— Defensibility of Malaya. Did the Americans realize that their 
present attitude might imply they had written off Malaya? Should 
London accept this implication without question? Might not the 
Australian attitude towards the defence of Malaya be substantially 




— Efforts to ensure that Dulles and Eden kept an open mind [matter 
unclear in document] and not reach a final decision on major issues 
pending discussions in Manila at foreign minister level.61 
 
The Australians needed to get their legalities in order, as did most 
other parties  privy to the processes that formalized the Manila Treaty. 
The Australians carefully monitored and tried to decipher the American 
reservation in the treaty text, making sure that they were always abreast 
of developments.62 Australian planners knew they had to be in the game 
and at the table. They could not sit back and let developments overtake 
them. Timing provided a link between great power motivations, intentions 
and actions, but also opportunities for Australia to make an impact. 
Australian analysts found that American administration policy was still 
based on collective security, while the Republicans in the US preferred 
greater selectivity over allies and less regard for universal solutions. 
Dulles faced a crumbling of “united action” against communist expansion. 
The grave situation in Asia was expressed thus: “Vietnam may be lost in 
two years. Japan is sick. Communist China has come out of Geneva with 
an enhanced diplomatic status which evidently cannot be long denied. 
Britain wants conciliation, and is suspected.” The US had modified its 









a form of unity to be communicated to Congress, in order to cut through 
the frustration of a collective approach and instead draw attention 
towards a long-range strategic air force, and the atomic bomb. Only a few 
months before the change of political constellations in Vietnam, it was 
reiterated that no American would support the use of force in Southeast 
Asia. The Australians expressed the issue as “we, and S.E. Asia, are still 
remote”. Secretary to the Department of External Affairs Arthur Tange 
was to conclude that an Australian ratification of SEATO without 
reservation was the best way forward.63 
Australia’s careful attention to US motivations did not lessen its 
obligations to the UK. The UK High Commissioner in Canberra wrote to 
the Department of External Affairs, reacting to reports by two Australian 
newspapers that Eden’s non-attendance at the Manila conference was 
evidence that Britain had “written off” Australia. The reports claimed that 
SEATO was “playing a poor second fiddle in Britain….the average Briton 
seems to know next to nothing about SEATO…and he seems to care even 
less about what SEATO means to Australia”. The High Commissioner 
called this “ill conditioned nonsense”.64 
Australian force contributions required careful planning under 
SEATO provisions, but this applied to all parties privy to the treaty. The 
other side of this was to consider economic aid to the region, especially in 
the case of threats to legitimacy. But aid itself was subject to a test of 





5, SEATO consultations and planning had a direct effect on the 
earmarking of Australian forces.65 Other provisions were discussed, 
including reluctantly accepting a Pacific charter-type arrangement while 
discouraging the Philippine attempt to encourage self-determination 
through the treaty.  
During negotiations, officers from overseas posts recognized the 
importance of timely notifications. McKnight from Singapore cabled 
Canberra on 11 September 1954 to highlight how the events and 
decisions behind Australian ratification would be a complex process. The 
telegram mentioned Tange’s note about tabling the text of SEATO in 
parliament — and that it was important to debate the text in parliament 
before proceeding with the treaty, and to decide whether or not to ratify 
the treaty including US conditions for ratification (referring to its 
reservation in terms of communist aggression). This would make 
explaining the why of entering into SEATO easier, in terms of popular 
consultation through democratic processes. However, the process could 
also buy time for Casey to gain some perspective from his talks in 
Rangoon and more easily ascertain Pakistan’s attitude.66 
Further, there was urgency for technical and other reasons — two 
members were not well, and could not secure flight arrangements to 
deliver the message in Canberra faster. Another technical challenge in 






related complications — the pace of events that burdened the compilation 
of information, and the efforts of a single official, Kaye, to relay 
messages.67 The implication of this is that a policy establishment could 
not conform to the seemingly mechanical and impersonal appearance it is 
often assumed to embody. Often, the actions of a single official, or lack 
thereof, could have serious consequences on the decision-making process 
at the highest levels. 
From bed, recovering from a heavy cold, Alan Watt, Tange’s 
predecessor at the Department of External Affairs, wrote to Tange that 
“we must never again allow the Americans to place us in the position of 
having to accept a terminal date to a conference before it meets”.68 This 
was not the first time that Australian diplomats would indicate a desire 
not to be left behind, especially in matters concerning the influence they 
exerted on the US.  Watt suggested that Canberra sent mixed signals on 
the topic of aggression in the treaty text. On the one hand, it was useful 
to delete the term “communist”; on the other, some signals suggested 
Australian reservation in line with the American position of action only in 
the event of communist aggression. Cabinet was unclear how terms such 
as “act” in Article 4 (1) of the treaty would be understood from the 
perspective of committing Australian forces.69 Casey won the respect of 








this left him unclear on whether or not to make a reservation when the 
US and the UK were so clearly opposed. Language in the text of the 
treaty would capture the divergence of intentions, positions and outcomes 
of the powers who eventually signed the treaty. 
Australia knew it had to leverage on the US guarantee, while 
advancing its own interests. Watt put it well — indecision by the parties 
privy to the conference may have resulted in “the Conference a fiasco, 
Communist propaganda given a perfect field and SEATO perhaps damned 
at birth”. The New Zealand Minister for External Affairs, Clifton Webb, 
praised Casey for getting a specific reference to military planning in the 
treaty under Article 5.70 However, the New Zealand officials complained to 
the Australians over US comments on a possible “vacillation” in their 
position and commitment. While the US made some commitments to 
planning which involved the UK, Australia and New Zealand, it was 
unclear how or when such planning would take place.  
While Australia did not eventually sign the treaty with reservation, it 
made clear the pressing threat of communist aggression that would 
menace freedom in Southeast Asia. Similarly, due consideration was 
given to any commitments that might result in Australian involvement in 
Southeast Asia in internal disputes that did not concern communist 
aggression or American participation. Cabinet decided that Australia 
should sign the treaty with a similar reservation to the US, but a major 





against such a course by Australia. Australia did not eventually sign the 
treaty with formal reservation, but thought “it necessary to say that we 
regard it as the real purpose of the treaty to present a concerted front 
against aggressive Communism, which presents the free world with its 
immediate problem of security”. Signing the treaty with or without a 
reservation may have hinged on the attitude of bigger powers, but this 
does not imply that Australia’s actions were an act of obligation to them.71 
Reservations were a bugbear that troubled relations between 
parties to the SEATO treaty. Dulles, in a personal letter to Menzies before 
leaving Manila, noted how serious persuasion after “the greatest 
difficulty” made the Philippines withdraw its decision to sign with a 
reservation and hoped Menzies would decide against such an Australian 
reservation.72 The case was made that the US, because it was not part of 
the geographical area, could act against aggression only if it was of a 
communist nature, as other forms of aggression need not threaten US 
national security. The UK would continue to make overtures to the Indian 
and Ceylonese governments that, because the treaty was not offensive 
but defensive in nature, it did not interfere with the promotion of self-
government and economic advancement of Asian states. 
It was proposed that SEATO be open to more members, should the 







of trying to incorporate Asian polities into the organization, and sealing its 
legitimacy. 
Australia needed to manage the shift towards new partners in 
defence without abandoning ties of kinship and commonwealth with its 
traditional allies. Casey contemplated including the UK in ANZUS planning 
as a way to navigate between the divergent positions of the US and the 
UK at the conference, but a position paper sums the point nicely as to 
how Australia attempted to wade through the difficult waters of the 
incongruous positions: “we have to steer between the U.K. and the U.S. 
Ultimately, to achieve what we want in SEATO, we have to be with the 
U.S.- but not against U.K.”73 
The Protocol States, alongside and corresponding to the legal 
justifications to draft them into the treaty without formal participation by 
the members, were further reflected and in some sense reassured as part 
of the geographical area of the treaty’s concern but might not be 
defended without their consent. UK planners tried to reflect that apart 
from the Indochina states, similar designations without request were out 
of the question. These reflected their attempt to balance their growing 
need to persuade their former colonies and similar Asian states or polities 
that they were acting in their interests. All this was not a display of 
rhetorical skill. The significance of and success of the Geneva Conference 
hinged on Eden’s and more broadly British efforts to manage the 




Australian diplomat James Plimsoll reflected in his discussions with 
the French that the interests of Australia lay in engaging with the area 
covered by SEATO but to designate it adequately to meet the threat. 
Similarly, the French were interested in how the existing Five Power Staff 
agency might play a role in SEATO. This was met with ambiguity, like 
many other statements concerning the shape and nature of the 
organization in late 1954: they gave an idea that the formal structure of 
SEATO was not set in stone.74 Basic operating principles need not 
translate into a systematic and sustained effort to create a machinery for 
the organization, but this was not yet the most important task at hand. 
The matter of the Associated States was, clearly, pertinent to all parties 
planning their defence. The Americans communicated to the British that 
the draft treaty should not be shown to the Associated States at that 
moment. 
Similarly, it would not be politically advantageous to have to consult 
the French, especially because of their position in the post-colonial 
situation. This unease with the French in the new political atmosphere 
was extended to aid: the US wanted to channel aid into Vietnam but it 
was seen as more expedient to give direct aid rather than channel it 
through the French. This did not please the French, who said if the aid 
was given this might “excite the Chinese” and undermine the legitimacy 






The Australian Defence Committee, reviewing the treaty obligations 
and the reports of the UK proposals in document COS (54) 259,75 
suggested that the area to be covered by the treaty was a political 
question, but effective military planning could occur only if the general 
treaty area was adopted. It suggested that it would contribute forces to 
the strategic reserve — one bomber squadron, two fighter squadrons 
(subject to shift in No. 77 squadron from Korea and redeployment of 
personnel of No. 78 wing from Manila) and one airfield construction 
squadron. Also, it was noted that the squadrons in the Middle East could 
be used in Malaya during peacetime, or deployed as “an Australian 
contribution to collective action in Southeast Asia”. 
Shifting from official negotiations to the domestic arena, it is 
imperative to consider public opinion in terms of the legitimacy of the 
organization at home, in Australia, with regard to SEATO. In a poll 
conducted in early September 1954, both the Sydney Sun and Adelaide 
Advertiser broadsheets suggested that there was overwhelming support 
for the organization, one headline proclaiming that it should be supported 
“with force”. This can perhaps relate to attitudes of the general security 
climate of the time, especially in the article in the Sun, which reflected 
that an Australian volunteer force could “help stop communist over-







that did not hinder but instead supported increased but qualified 
involvement in organizations such as SEATO. A fractured Labor party, the 
scares of domestic subversion in the form of communist persons and 
organizations operating within Australian shores, and the continued 
championing by the government of the organization as legitimate 
contributed to an atmosphere positive to SEATO but cautious in terms of 
exact military contributions and the directed but not improper use of force.  
From the negotiations of the treaty and the discussions that were 
undertaken relating to its clauses, and the settlement and signature of 
the Southeast Asia Collective Defence Treaty in September 1954 onwards, 
a few themes stand out in terms of the Australian approach. These 
directly revolve around the two organizing points of timing and overlaps. 
They can be summarised in three brief, but encompassing points. 
Aggression for Australian planners became largely a matter of Communist 
aggression, and there was a growing emphasis on the priority of the 
Protocol States as first priority territories. Second, SEATO reinforced 
previous structures and Australian commitments to them, but by no 
means negated them. This is especially important with regards to the Far 
East Strategic Reserve, and the contributions thereto. Third, problems of 
consensus emerged from divergences in approach, but did not hinder the 
overall delineation of a treaty area and the general consensus that 
capabilities would be directed to this area. SEATO became a structure that 




needed to build capabilities in the economic sphere, the military deterrent, 
and the ability to identify and counter subversion.  SEATO in this period 
became more than the sum of complex negotiations, although the 
numerous drafts to the treaty would suggest a deep sense of caution in 
finding ways to give expression to the impetus of defending a regional 
zone. The signatories of the Pact came to realize the old dictum that 
commitments needed to be honoured, but the ways in which they put 
forward resources and interest into the commitments would play out in 
important ways to the development of a legitimate organization. 
 
Conclusion 
Australian planners played an active role in the post-war world, using 
numerous platforms to balance great power relationships alongside new 
partnerships that focused on positive and constructive engagements with 
the Southeast Asian region, among other Commonwealth obligations. This 
did not always materialise in the form of military pacts, but certainly 
through SEATO took shape in such a manner. Australian planners tried to 
keep themselves abreast of developments so to have the ability to 
influence them. In the case of SEATO, indeed both were the case. But this 
did not negate the broader underlying reality that differences in 
understanding among principal members of the organization, the US and 
the UK over the approach to aggression- played out tellingly through the 
American reservation to the treaty- made the organization fall short of a 
NATO-style guarantee. What Australia brought to the table was the ability 
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to play a role pushing for greater legitimacy in terms of military 
effectiveness and also political constructiveness in embracing Asian 
opinion in the organization. These were not ends in themselves.  
Australian politicians and policymakers needed to contend with the 
forces of the Cold War, pushed along by numerous conflicts in the region 
to their north geographically. This meant that forward defence 
necessitated the means used to achieve the influence they exerted in 
SEATO. The organization can be seen as a potential, but not complete 
bridge, between obligations under ANZAM and ANZUS, solidifying a 
guarantee to the defence of Southeast Asia through a Western platform. 
The conventional threats to the region were pronounced, especially in a 
post-Korean War world, and with the seemingly ubiquitous armed forces 
of the People’s Volunteers in China, becoming a professionalised force. 
Southeast Asia became a centrepiece in the broader strategic arena 
where territories were not just subject to the possibility of such 
conventional invasion, but also subversive infiltration. Australian planners 
knew that an organization such as SEATO could be the deterrent against 
such motivations. But they could only do so much to legitimize its 












Chapter 2: Building Legitimacy: Australia and the 
Development of SEATO 
 
“Because we have won two world wars by outproducing our opponent, we 
have tended to equate military superiority with superiority in resources 
and technology. Yet history demonstrates that superiority in strategic 
doctrine has been the source of victory at least as often as superiority in 
resources … superior mobility and superior use of artillery, a better 
relationship between fire and movement, provided the basis of Napoleon’s 
victories … all these were victories not of resources but of strategic 
doctrine: the ability to break the framework and to make the victory all 
the more complete by confronting the enemy with contingencies he never 
even considered. Thus a key to a proper doctrine is the correct 
understanding of one’s own superiority, and the ability to apply them 
more rapidly than the opponent…” — Henry Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons 
and Foreign Policy77  
 
The growing institutionalization of SEATO between 1955 and 1959 
was paralleled by Australian planners who wanted a say in what the 
organization would become, notwithstanding Australian material 
limitations. The development of plans, and infrastructure to create and 
manage these plans, with other activities, complemented but did not 
always correspond to Australian officials’ objectives. Formalizing SEATO 
into an organization with a structure of supporting offices and committees 
involved legitimacy. Legitimizing the structure meant that the 
organization established concepts, standards, plans and overarching 




and related threats in what was termed the “Treaty Area”. The years that 
marked the formalization of the structures of SEATO depended on more 
than Australian planners’ objectives and their pursuit of aligning national 
goals to regional and broader defence objectives through the multilateral 
platform that was SEATO. 
Consensus was needed to provide both military and political 
legitimacy. This was important in the former case to provide a capable 
deterrent. In the latter, it gave the organization a basis to work positively 
to develop the Southeast Asian region and communicate a constructive 
agenda to the region and other powers. However, consensus meant 
relating diverse SEATO member interests and intentions to tangible 
outcomes. This had some success, in that structures and plans were 
developed on an organizational basis. But consensus was not a guarantee 
of an orchestrated commitment to action in the event of threats to the 
Treaty Area. 
Australia, concomitantly, sought to legitimize its own role and 
buttress and promote its own grand strategy of forward defence in SEATO. 
But this did not only take the form of military planning, nor did military 
planning refer only to conventional ground forces. Australian planners 
faced the problem of the pronounced and growing threat of subversion in 
Southeast Asia, but also had to face an Eisenhower administration that 
emphasized “New Look” as a grand strategy which reappraised and 
modified Containment but did not reject it. What this meant for Australian 
planners, and SEATO more broadly, was to consider threats and the use 
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of force to meet these threats in a way which considered not only 
conventional scenarios, but also countersubversion and nuclear war. 
Deterrence was a key goal of Australian and SEATO planners in this 
period, and both considered how it could effectively meet the threat in 
various scenarios. In historiographical terms, this chapter should 
demonstrate that in these years, broadly speaking 1955 to 1959, SEATO 
plans to meet threats and create opportunities for development are 
evidence that the organization was not a mere paper tiger from its 
inception. Instead, it aimed to be a legitimate deterrent. 
As a middle power, Australia had limitations that required it to 
depend on the preponderant power of its great friends. But Australia used 
its position not just to influence and be included in a smaller club of 
nations within SEATO, but more broadly tried to promote its own work 
and the work of the organization as both effective and constructive, which 
meant defending the goals of the organization as legitimate, and 
translating promises into concrete plans. This was critical to ensure the 
investment of power by the UK and the US in the region, but in a sense 
this investment would directly contribute to forward defence. But 
dependence did not mean reliance, nor did the US and the UK make the 
organization the sum of its parts. To keep the work of SEATO timely and 
relevant, planners needed to engage with all powers in the organization, 
and apply the best plans to different scenarios. Changing circumstances 
required not just consensus or preponderant power, but an actual 
coordination and demonstration of an effective deterrent. Planners 
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understood they could not fix forces to situations in which the threat itself 
was variable and conditional on the broader situation of Cold War politics, 
regional aspirations towards nationalism,78 and subversion. For Australia, 
these issues were not imagined scenarios. Not being prepared enough 
could mean the fall of Southeast Asia to global communism, and a direct 
threat to the Australian homeland. 
It must be said that the Australian policymaking establishment, 
while evolving in this period to meet greater bureaucratic requirements 
and address regional and broader global challenges during the Cold War, 
did not change much in substance, especially in these years. This should 
not imply, however, a preponderance of consensus at home, while the 
Menzies government did secure a continuing pre-eminence politically. As 
Christopher Waters notes in the case of Richard Casey in the Department 
of External Affairs, Casey worked better with Arthur Tange than with his 
predecessor, Alan Watt. What began as a positive relationship between 
Casey and Tange, who was “direct and decisive … he bestrode his 
talented but small and struggling Department like a colossus”, began to 
find fault lines in the latter half of the 1950s after “Casey’s ineffectiveness 
in Cabinet and his penchant for covert activities, rather than diplomacy, 
became a major source of frustration for Tange.”79 This, and a 






minister, did not stop him or the government who “emphasized the role of 
SEATO at every possible opportunity.”80 
A similar dynamic can be seen in a more serious policy in the later 
1950s on West New Guinea. While the previous administration had 
supported Indonesian independence, Australia had not championed all 
transfers of sovereignty under such an arrangement. This led to its 
support of Dutch claims over New Guinea, and Cold War uncertainties 
over the internal situation in Indonesia led Casey to say in Cabinet that “it 
is desirable in the interests of Australia’s own defence that West New 
Guinea should be in the hands of a non-Communist government. 
Indonesia is non-Communist but … we cannot be sure that it will not in 
the course of time come into the communist orbit”. Similarly, in 1957, by 
aligning itself with the Dutch claims “Australia angered not only Indonesia 
but a growing number of newly independent Asian and African states.” 
This implies that Australia, while maintaining a broad support for 
nationalist claims, was also subject to the Menzies government’s earlier 
suspicions about Indonesian intentions, and relations were strained by 
Indonesian claims over sovereignty as well as the broader Cold War 
context.81 Thus, as before, Australian interests to forward its own grand 
strategy took priority over championing of regional aspirations, but the 
two were related. 
 





From 1955 onwards, it became clear that SEATO forces needed to be 
deployed in scenarios that would jeopardize the status of, especially but 
not limited to, South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, where SEATO 
guarantees to the Protocol States also meant having adequate forces on 
the ground. In Pearl Harbor in 1955, staff planners decided the minimum 
holding position would be Saigon. They also regarded 90 days as the time 
in which SEATO forces should engage the potential threat, thus meeting 
deployment requirements. It is important to note that while planners 
understood the defence of the Protocol States, this did not exhaust their 
focus areas and thus plans were developed to other places affected by 
potential or actual communist threats, especially Thailand and Pakistan. 
While overt threats were the most prominent focus in 1955, this did not 
exclude subversion.82 
In the event of direct Chinese aggression in the Treaty Area, staff 
planners in 1955 considered using atomic munitions. This produced the 
first SEATO paper that envisaged the use of such munitions, and divided 
them into three categories of bombs. The first were those capable of 
major destruction (a city), the second medium destruction (an airfield, or 
aircraft and major facilities in it), the third limited, which could destroy 
troop concentrations. Timing was important to ensure the appropriate 
response, which meant that priority of attack had to be based on class of 
targets. Twenty-five first priority targets were identified for atomic attack 





attack. But atomic weapons did not preclude putting boots on the ground. 
Indigenous forces were to be encouraged to play a role in deterring 
potential aggression. Terrain was an issue, especially in Indochina, where 
mobility was required to support infantry in the form of amphibious units, 
parachute units and the like.83 Similar assessments were made about the 
ability of the enemy to conceive and develop a nuclear approach of its 
own. As Fenton notes: 
 
While the PRC’s efforts to create its own nuclear 
weapons were noted, it was felt that it would be many 
years before this programme would succeed in its aims. 
Furthermore, there was a surprisingly resolute 
confidence that whatever other military aid would be 
supplied from the Soviet Union to the PRC, the transfer 
of nuclear weapons would not be forthcoming … there 
was no doubt on the part of Western analysts that while 
Moscow [in 1956] was happy to support the build-up of 
a competent and capable Chinese ally in Asia, it had no 
wish to create a strategic rival for the leadership of the 
communist world.84  
 
Similarly, SEATO planning did not focus in depth on nuclear war, 
and the link here is the US, its preponderant power in the alliance when it 
came to nuclear capabilities, and there was “nothing to be gained by 
involving their SEATO allies in planning for operations the latter would 
take no practical part in.” Coordinating the interests of alliance use of 
nuclear weapons in its plans and the need to have an American partner 
that supplied the bulk of such capabilities, SEATO resorted to an opaque 





substance.85 Alas, legitimacy is often about appearances, not just definite 
and defined capabilities. The only other power that planned to a similar 
effect was the UK. Regarding the re-examination but not rejection of the 
US Containment policy under the New Look, with an emphasis on 
retaliation, we should consider these implications: 
 
Reduced to simplest terms, then, the new-style 
Containment would depend primarily on offensive 
retaliatory power, chiefly strategic nuclear weapons plus 
continental defence. All other elements of military 
power would play a subordinate role, particularly 
conventional ground forces.86 
 
Australia had to contend with its own military ground contributions 
in Malaya during this period, where SEATO became entangled in overlaps 
with the defence of Malaya and the complication of national aspirations in 
the face of decolonization. When Menzies declared that Australian forces 
in Malaya would be “constantly related to SEATO defence,” this both 
promoted Australia’s faith in SEATO and indicated “implicitly doubting 
Britain’s logistic capability in Southeast Asia in a general war.”87 
Nationalism would come in the form of a Malayan lack of involvement in 
SEATO, but also overtures doubting the organization’s good intentions 
among nationalist leaders. For example, in 1957 and 1958, Tunku Abdul 








involve Malaya on the British side of an anti-colonial conflict…by 
dismissing Malayan involvement in any internal conflict that did not 
threaten Malaya”. Chin Kin Wah expressed the attitudes of Malayan 
leaders well: “in Malayan perception, membership of SEATO was 
strategically unnecessary, politically unpopular, and generally 
ineffective.”88 This was compounded by the Tunku in 1960 “when he 
raised serious doubts about the efficacy of SEATO as a collective defence 
organization.”89 The overlap and complications were real considerations 
planners faced over allocating resources, how to relate defence 
commitments to new understandings of SEATO, and perhaps also Western 
defence plans for Southeast Asia in different arrangements during the 
latter half of the 1950s. But Australia was interested in cultivating the 
views of nationalist leaders in Asia to support the organization and to 
legitimate the presentation of the organization as effective in deterring 
threats that were communist in nature. These endeavors did not, in a less 
than propitious turn to the initial intent to incorporate more Asian powers 
into SEATO, result in more Asian members joining the organization. 
Instead, due to influential critiques by leaders such as India’s Nehru, and 
the emergence of the Non-Aligned Movement in 1955, efforts to persuade 
Asian opinion were met with ambivalence at best and in the case of 
Malaya, a less than positive opinion in response. SEATO’s official 
machinery made efforts to demonstrate the good that the organization 





present a picture of being overwhelmingly concentrated within SEATO 
Asian member parties, as is reflected in the SEATO Report series.  
Australia was not just interested in engaging with regional defence 
through SEATO, but also saw the potential for the organization to plan for 
global war scenarios, although this was qualified by the problem of 
obtaining consensus and planning to meet such scenarios.90 Overlaps in 
commitments and arrangements here come to the fore. In one sense, the 
guarantee of the US would be necessary to proceed in terms of using 
SEATO as an instrument to deal with global war scenarios, especially 
because of the force it could bring to the table. But bilateral discussions 
were held between Australia and the US under the platform of ANZUS. In 
fact, in late 1956 US Admiral Felix Stump advised that it was indeed 
advisable to discuss the approach at the ANZUS meeting before the 
SEATO meeting was held. The correspondence concerning global war 
between Admiral Stump and Australian representatives suggests another 
avenue that is important to understand the use of different platforms to 
advance Australian and other policy goals in this period.91 This is the 
development of a closer cooperation among New Zealand, Australia, the 
UK and the US when it came to intelligence sharing, as well as conferring 
on matters of military planning. This concerned not just threats in 







Indonesia.92 The global war focus would play out in Australian interests in 
assessing its ability to use particular measures to counter regional threats 
as well as whether or not these would precipitate global war, in 1956. In 
conditions short of global war, this was important in the event of the use 
of atomic weapons. Australian planners discussed the distinctions 
between atomic and thermonuclear weapons. While it was seen that 
atomic weapons were more likely to be used than thermonuclear, the 
Australian Joint Planning Committee noted the need to be clear when 
assessing the attitudes of powers such as the US, perhaps by discussing 
this at ANZUS council meetings.93 
The growing coordination among Australia and other powers in an 
“inner” working group of nations also depended on military overlaps that 
existed due to already agreed-upon military obligations in the region. One 
such obligation or arrangement was the strategic reserve. While the 
forces necessary could be contributed in tandem with the UK and New 
Zealand, such a reserve, in 1956, was estimated to also contribute to the 
defence of the Treaty Area. Plimsoll noted that such a contribution 
“stress[ed] the importance of the defence of the treaty area without being 
definite about the relationship between the strategic reserve and 
SEATO.”94 This inner working group seems to correspond to the fact that 
Australia had mutual defence commitments already established with the 







together without nullifying the existing obligations or modifying the 
guarantees to a great degree. SEATO provided the opportunity to bring 
both great powers together, along with New Zealand to a common 
working platform to secure regional defence. This also bridged the gap 
between existing commitments to defending the Pacific and Malayan 
areas, to more broadly incorporate the Southeast Asian mainland area. 
This had a positive implication to Australian interests of maintaining a 
policy of Forward Defence. SEATO also did not cause an unnecessary 
burden to force commitments under the arrangements previously agreed 
to in ANZAM and ANZUS; in the case of the former, there was a clear 
overlap between force commitments. SEATO made possible increased 
defence arrangements without nullifying previous commitments. It also 
allowed Australian planners to use the opportunity to have more 
platforms to engage with big powers in their security planning.  
Old problems relating to consensus, in terms of the inability to 
reconcile the purposes of SEATO with the aims of member states to 
promote their views on what these purposes should be, made themselves 
manifest in the military planning of the organization, and especially how 
that planning would be communicated to the broader public. This related 
directly to legitimacy, and the presentation of a capable deterrent force, 
that could, if called upon, defeat threats to the Treaty Area. One case 
which related to this and involved Australia was during staff planners’ 
meetings in 1956, where the Philippine representatives were said to have 
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stated that “nothing concrete is being done by SEATO”.95 Such criticisms 
were not new, nor were sentiments by other parties that called into 
question the reliability of their Asian partners, especially when there were 
claimed leaks to the Philippine press about confidential SEATO 
correspondence and procedures. Canberra made its position clear to 
Manila: public criticism of that sort “gives encouragement to the 
Communists and other opponents of SEATO and casts doubt in mind as to 
the effectiveness of SEATO”.96 
An avenue to address criticisms of SEATO was to allow individuals 
such as General Charles Loewen of the UK to speak to the press. One 
article published by The Age entitled “SEATO as ‘Shield of Freedom’: 
Military Staff Planners meet in Singapore” reported Loewen’s rebuttal of 
criticisms that the organization had become a threat to peace, or had no 
teeth. Loewen likened the role and purpose of SEATO to a shield, but 
qualified that the organization had to take more time to develop and 
entrench its practices. Similarly, General John Wilton of Australia made a 
broadcast via ABC Singapore. He stressed that security had to be seen as 
addressing not only armed aggression but also communist subversion, 
adding that “it is to be expected that the working out of complex military 








As organizational structures could support more complex military 
planning, this allowed planners to focus on exercises to meet the threat at 
hand more comprehensively. During the 10th Military Advisers meeting at 
Wellington in April 1959, an exercise to counter communist insurgency 
was tabled for the organization to take up the following year. But the US 
Military Adviser said such an exercise should not be publicised at all due 
to sensitivity. Similarly, at the meeting, “advisers agreed that insurgency 
was the most important question to be studied at the present time.”98 
 
Standardization 
Standardization, a mark of the growth of a more professional and 
coordinated organization, was considered seriously, and in June 1956, 
staff planners in Singapore decided to allocate responsibilities to this end 
in military terms. In Pearl Harbor in 1955, it was established that 
standardization and coordination would allow tying together support for 
forces in proximate geographical regions — for example, forces in 
Thailand could be related to those in Indochina. This illustrates military 
planning of a broader trend in SEATO, that of the growing need for 
administrative coherence and formalization, to legitimize itself and prove 
effective as a capable deterrent.99 In Singapore in 1956, SEATO asked the 
US to initiate and coordinate action for equipment standardization. This 
included the use of technical experts to assess and propose ways in which 





brought under a system of common nomenclature. This helped to 
determine and designate the national origin of equipment used. While 
Australian planners established that all their equipment was of either UK 
or US origin, they did not see it as useful to conduct a similar survey on 
the origins of equipment under SEATO auspices.100 
The development of strategic concepts would contribute to 
standardization but these did not lead directly to the creation of the 
Military Planning Office, a permanent structure to oversee military 
coordination in SEATO. Rather, the process of appointments can be seen 
as evolutionary — though the time frame from inception to a fully formed 
Military Planning Office was only two years. The appointment of a security 
coordinator was an important step because the security coordinator would 
ensure adequate standardization of classification of documents and confer 
and offer advice on security matters to the Military Liaison Group.101 
Moving the organization toward more sophisticated planning with a 
manageable logistical plan meant more administrative standardization. 
Hence, the creation of the Military Planning Office relieved the burden on 
ad-hoc arrangements that created, as Fenton shows the parties agreed, 
“inadequacies revealed by experience.”102 
The creation of the Military Planning Office was a necessary 
corrective to the ad-hoc committee system in SEATO, which was 







planning using a system where months could elapse … was a recipe for a 
painfully drawn out, expensive and inefficient process.” In March 1956, 
military advisers considered the possibility of a Military Planning Office, 
and it was recommended that the Military Planning Office supersede the 
existing Military Liaison Group. Australia suggested the Philippines as the 
headquarters of the Military Planning Office, as it could “provide English 
speaking personnel more readily than Thailand.” Eventually, however, 
both military and civilian arms of the organization were symbolically 
located next to each other in Bangkok.103 
Australia’s concerns with standardization included allocation of 
personnel, showing how policy decisions had implications on staffing and 
therefore allocation of resources and posting. This meant appointing 
secretarial assistance to aid Australian planners, to support the Australian 
head of Secretariat to SEATO. More clerical assistance meant the 
appointment of a new clerk/typist to help SEATO representatives with 
their work, replacing the old ad-hoc arrangement where one Sergeant 
Meredith would fulfil duties as a stopgap measure.104 
Standardization also appeared in the creation of standardized 
materials to show coherence in producing and developing an agenda, and 
the image SEATO wished to present. This, too, was grounded in 
legitimacy. A series of reports detailing and recording developments in 
the organization was developed under the title SEATO Record. It would 





meetings were reported and progress was charted in terms of three major 
points, accessible to the interested reader: 
— Maintenance of the defensive capacity of treaty members to deal 
effectively with armed aggression; 
— Extension of the programme to detect, appraise, expose and 
combat subversion directed from without; 
— Development of the economic resources of treaty members, 
particularly the Asian member states, by measures inside and 
outside SEATO105 
Such publications would also feature initiatives in development, 
medical research and military aspects. It would also add a visual 
dimension to planning meetings. Figure 1 illustrates one such Military 
Advisers meeting in Canberra in 1957, opened by Philip McBride, 
Australian Minister for Defence: 
 








Political and Other Initiatives to Combat Subversion 
Subversion was already a pressing issue when SEATO was formed, but 
the work of its Committee of Security Experts in SEATO, formed to 
broaden of the institutional capacity of the organization, produced 
detailed plans and appreciations. This often linked to “political” sphere 
calculations, but was not limited or did not exclude military means. 
However, it is important to note a growing shift toward aspects that did 
not include communist efforts for a land invasion or direct aggression to 
the Treaty Area. This would take the form of activities in the political 
sphere of countries that appeared more “subtle” but intimated a different 
communist approach to make gains in the region.107 Planners saw that 
South Vietnam was to be preserved as anti-communist. But the rest of 
the Treaty Area was also important, not least due to nationalist claims 






places such as Singapore, Lim Yew Hock carried out a “courageous” and, 
at the time, successful campaign against subversive elements. Similarly, 
in Burma, rice was identified as a potential key link in the equation — 
where a better market for rice existed, this could reduce the need to 
conduct “unsatisfactory barter deals with the communist bloc,” allowing it 
to trade more broadly. In Indonesia, at least in 1956 estimates, the 
communists were not included in government, but this did not preclude 
Sukarno from bringing them back into the political fold. Although in 1956 
Burma, Singapore and Indonesia looked encouraging, this was not 
grounds for complacency.108 
SEATO security experts noted a need to consider unconventional 
methods, because the communist parties were spreading propaganda 
linked to broader developments. The move towards rebellion in Hungary 
in 1956 would help to produce counter-propaganda. Asian parallels to this 
situation of a potential rebellion were considered, in China, Burma, India 
and Nepal. But these parallels were only discussed cursorily, and did not 
lead to concrete examples being followed or used in propaganda material. 
Australia’s role in the Committee of Security Experts followed a broader 
appreciation by Australian officials of the importance of unconventional 
threats and how to address these. In late 1956, the Australian 
representative felt that in the following year, the committee should focus 






The committee knew it required materials to deter the communist 
subversive threat, but Australian planners were concerned about how to 
produce these materials and whether they could fill a gap in research and 
distribution facilities in SEATO member states. 
Consensus was important among member states, but while 
capabilities differed in terms of infrastructure, and intentions were 
particular to political entities and liable to change, the SEATO Committee 
of Security Experts determined that the SEATO Public Relations Office 
should highlight the incompatibility between communism and nationalism. 
This was important especially because different arms of broader 
subversive groups and parties linked to communist fronts might adopt 
neutralism to infiltrate not just the political realm, but also trade unions, 
and to influence youth. Overseas Chinese communities were particularly 
susceptible.110 But such propaganda, and more importantly neutralism, 
was speculated to be part of a new communist strategy. This could take 
the form of a “new” and “soft” diplomatic, political and economic 
approach, which might be applied to neutralist states. This is significant 
because neutrality, and also neutralization, could be seen not as a 
political solution but as an incipient and potentially harmful threat. This 
was articulated in reports by the Committee of Security Experts, which 
saw that the pronouncements of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union 







Party were used to promote ideology to nationalist regimes that might 
lead to subservience to either “Moscow or Peiping”. This took the form of 
an appearance of promoting Asian communist parties and their 
collaboration with other parties, exacerbating friction among friendly 
Asian nations. This in turn would create a bloc of Asian nations averse to 
ties with the West. Thus, neutralism and nationalism were seen as threats 
if they were to be exploited by the greater communist powers, especially 
if they could be brought into subservience.111 Australian planners 
encouraged members to submit examples of publicity against communism 
and the message of communists to the SEATO Public Relations Office. 
This would help the SEATO budget by placing more responsibility on 
member states. 
This focus on the subversive element meant it was seen as a 
legitimate threat that required a timely response. This is evident in 
reports that observed Chinese funding to parties such as the Burma 
Workers’ and Peasants’ Party to make possible parliamentary 
representation. Similarly, disciplinary problems in Singapore’s Chinese-
medium schools were seen as possible links within the broader strategy. 
Australian politicians such as Casey highlighted the need to link 
welfare and security. This was apparent, in one instance, when he 
delivered a speech in Karachi in 1956 to the Council of Ministers relating 
those two themes. In the broader Cold War context, fears of a potential 




monopoly, driving countries into more neutralist camp positions. 
Representatives in the Committee of Security Experts encouraged 
activities other than propaganda to meet the communist threat.112 
Reports suggested a SEATO-based seminar to address the global threat of 
subversion, while UK officials in one report listed more than 34 types of 
subversion, including labour dispute interventions, youth and cultural 
movements and their infiltration, offensive and subversive broadcasts, 
which represented a shift to “new communist tactics”.113 
When Australian officials conferred with US representatives 
including Douglas MacArthur Jr., in 1956, they asked about overlaps in 
existing commitments, such as the Colombo Plan, and the use of SEATO 
in non-military terms. The outcome was to establish that SEATO should 
not appear to only be a military collective, but it had a long way to go to 
become more efficient and thus more administratively effective. This 
would be addressed in part by the growth in subsequent years of 
administrative structures within the organization.114 
The work of the SEATO Committee of Security Experts from 1958 to 
1960 focused on studying and proposing measures to counter 
“Communist efforts to penetrate the free countries of South-East Asia”.115 
While military means and efforts were important, subversion was seen to 









sponsored from without. Studies conducted by SEATO representatives in 
various Southeast Asian countries included factors such as ethnography, 
which allowed them to assess the link and probability of the threat of 
communist subversion to affect ethnic minorities.116 The broad 
appreciation of communist political activity through subversion would also 
spill into the military dimension, especially through guerilla warfare. 
SEATO studies would formulate a sophisticated appreciation of the guerilla 
threat, especially with consideration of the terrain, and rural make up of 
different areas determined to be at risk or already featuring such a threat. 
 
Fig 2. SEATO Security Experts Assessment of Communist 









Communist insurgency, and its manifestation in guerilla warfare, 
was a real and  present threat to SEATO. This would extend to 
consideration of international borders as areas of refuge, in particular the 
Thai-Malayan border that was seen as a shelter for Malayan Communist 
Party elements. The problems were pronounced in Indochina, where there 
had been gains by communist and leftist elements in elections in Laos, as 
well as subversive elements operating in South Vietnam under the aegis 
of the Vietminh. SEATO made the realistic assessment that China or North 
Vietnam could provide logistical support to subversive elements in 
different struggles.118 
SEATO council representatives in 1959 promoted activities to study 
subversion as a threat to the region, following efforts in earlier years. 
Based on a working paper, in February that year they agreed in principle 
that a second seminar on countering subversion be held under SEATO 
auspices, to show a serious commitment to this problem.119 
 
Plan 5 and the Debacle in Laos 
In November 1959, the Joint Intelligence Committee in Australia met to 
discuss the likely effects of SEATO military intervention in Laos. For 
Australian planners, it was important to note, in terms of legitimacy of 






Laotian Government has appealed to SEATO to intervene militarily”.120 
But the plan here had to do with subversion becoming an existential 
threat to the Laotian government. Thus intervention had to be contingent 
on deterioration of the internal situation, but failure to intervene could 
mean “the almost certain disintegration of the SEATO organization itself”. 
Military means could be considered with the possibility of a stalemate. The 
need to defend Laos against falling to communist subversion would spell 
out the fate of SEATO as a deterrent. But fixed plans to deter, if not 
defeat, direct communist aggression were not the game of the day. At 
least in Laos, SEATO planners sought to deal with unconventional threats 
in Plan 5 to meet the challenge of the scenario. But much like the other 
events of the Cold War, they did not stand still and allow for fixed 
solutions. Plan 5, and the consequences of not having a SEATO 
intervention in Laos, would expose the problems of consensus in the 
organization. But to say that SEATO or its members were playing a game 
to ignore a threat is misleading. The development of plans and their 
implementation was complicated by other factors, often beyond the 
control of member states but occurring within the broadly defined Treaty 
Area. But as the Australian Military Adviser put it, for any intervention to 
be legitimate, “the aim of a SEATO force would be to help the Laotians to 








This chapter demonstrated, through a broad selection of source material 
relating to developments between 1955 and 1959, that characterized the 
development of SEATO institutionally, and Australia’s place within it. 
Australia aimed to build a legitimate deterrent militarily, but had to make 
it appear politically legitimate as well. This balance was not always an 
easy feat. Australian planners channeled their efforts in managing and 
balancing responsibilities by allocating resources across commitments, ie. 
to meetings in SEATO, ANZUS, and ANZAM, but these did not always 
correspond. SEATO began to take a life of its own and through the growth 
of apparatuses such as the Military Planning Office, began to develop 
concrete plans to combat the threats of the day. But this growth did not 
exactly translate into organizational effectiveness in meeting the threats. 
Assessments may have proved timely and relevant, but they were limited 
to defining and conceptualizing plausible modes of action, not guarantees 
of intervention. The threat itself become more difficult to define, 
becoming more pronounced in respect to subversion across territories in 
the Treaty Area. Attempts by SEATO to shift its focus to this are best 
represented by the work of representatives in the Committee of Security 
Experts and MPO Plan 5, the first such plan to deal with 
countersubversion.  
Australian policymaking at the highest levels did not change, but 
this coherence in political establishment and government did not imply a 
coherent scenario in the Cold War, which was becoming in all senses a 
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global conflict. Containment took a new guise under the New Look policy 
of the Eisenhower administration, and SEATO memoranda attests to the 
importance of the potential of atomic and potentially nuclear solutions to 
threats. Yet, as the epigraph at the beginning of the chapter notes, 
superior resources did not guarantee a superior doctrine. Consensus 
would be the key to translating superiority into effective deterrence, but 
differing priorities among states and their visions of legitimacy in the 
Treaty Area came to signify that accurate assessments and plans 
developed at the SEATO level did not obscure differences in capabilities, 
visions and intentions of the various parties privy to it. After all, structural 
development is not a guarantee of the implementation of a coherent 
strategy. Australian planners had to contend with forces outside its own 
ambit that would shape and influence the translation of consensus into 
action, such which they could only attempt to influence, but Australia, and 





















Chapter 3: Consensus Lost but Forward Defence 
Maintained — Australia, Plan 5 and Pursuing Best 
Interests 
 
“My Government’s defence policy was one of forward defence: to keep 
any war as far as possible from our own shores; to provide Australian 
defence in depth; to help produce a secure environment for our 
neighbours, with whom we are bound to have a close association as the 
years go by…” — Robert Menzies, The Measure of the Years122 
 
Australia continued to honour its obligations to its great and powerful 
friends in terms of committing itself to defence partnerships in the 
Southeast Asian region with both the US and UK, in the period 1959 to 
1962. One forum that tied these nations together was SEATO. However, 
for it to continue to be an effective platform to coordinate western 
defence planning in the region, its military deterrence capabilities had to 
meet the most pronounced threat. The SEATO Military Planning Office had 
developed a range of contingency plans to meet different threats, both 
conventional and unconventional. But while these plans involved different 




how to meet the threats was consensus. Here, the political came into play: 
political legitimacy and its undermining in Laos, in particular, tested the 
ability of SEATO to meet such threats. Here, Australia and SEATO stood in 
the shadow of great ideological struggles manifested in localized 
expressions of conflict that at once tested sovereignty, reinforced 
subversion as an existential threat, and proved the difficulty of 
establishing consensus. 
Australia continued to commit itself to the defence of the region 
through SEATO and its other obligations, but understood that these were 
means to the broader end of its grand strategy, forward defence. The 
symbolic basis of this is well expressed in the title of David Lee’s study, 
Search for Security.123 Security continued as a feature of strategic 
evaluations during and subsequent to efforts to channel resources to the 
Laotian question, most importantly how the region could be usurped by 
communist aggression, thus creating a more pronounced threat to the 
Australian homeland. 
SEATO established plans militarily to counter threats, but the 
scenario did not always correspond to the threat. Often, local agency and 
“interaction, synthesis and partnership”124 were more critical to the 
situation in the Treaty Area than the plans and intentions of superpowers, 






“disparities in capability between SEATO allies were so vast”,125 impacting 
the ability of member states to contribute forces. But disparity did not 
spell lack of consensus; instead, in its first few years, SEATO developed 
not merely structures but detailed appreciations of force estimates and 
countries in the Treaty Area susceptible to various threats. Even so, major 
powers in SEATO in the late 1950s had to show not just their intent to 
deter but also make their contributions in terms of forces as a guarantee 
to an effective deterrent. This was not easy considering the sometimes 
global imperatives of containing communist aggression, and commitments 
to other regions. Britain relied on ambiguity so it “could avoid having to 
actually confirm the extent to which any specific SEATO force contribution 
of theirs would utilise the potential of Singapore,” in the light of its base 
there. Similarly, the New Look policy in the latter half of the 1950s 
determined how the US could engage with SEATO but avoid NATO-style 
commitments.126 This, however, spoke to broad objectives, and did not 
lessen the importance of meeting threats in the region both politically and 
militarily. 
The first counter-insurgency plan, Plan 5, marked and symbolized 
Australian (and New Zealand) engagement with SEATO. In its formulation, 
Plan 5 could appear to undermine the Geneva Conference of 1954, which 
made it difficult to engage with prior agreements that already established 
legitimacy, especially considering that the International Control 





did not oppose it as much as the British did, as the British “were reluctant 
to see the plan develop much beyond” a concept of operations. This is 
because they wanted to see how seriously the US was approaching the 
plan.127 Plan 5 related directly to subversion and the deterioration in Laos. 
Implementation, or the lack of it, would spell the fledgling nature of 
consensus in orchestrating a coherent response to a situation that was 
fast becoming incoherent. This chapter will provide a general appreciation 
of the situation in Laos, explore the details and changes in approach 
through Plan 5, and situate Australian engagements with it. It will finish 
by appraising the Geneva Conference of 1962, where neutralization spelt 
the ineffectiveness of committing forces through SEATO and thus a lost 
consensus. This does not mean SEATO became ineffective after the 
conference, or that Australia’s commitment to the organization somehow 
dissolved. Neither is accurate. Instead, SEATO’s inability to act did not 
necessarily spell disaster for broader Australian strategic objectives. In 
fact, as Fenton shows, the organization continued to be relevant to the 
Americans, who saw it as a means to act with their partners in the region. 
Growing French and British disenchantment with SEATO 
notwithstanding, it was still the preferred means by which the US sought 
to engage in strategic military planning with its allies in the region. It 
allowed the US to influence the force development and contingency 




and New Zealand, while able to keep much of its own contingency plans 
for the region to itself.128 
This period also coincided with closer links between the US and 
Australia, but these were not Australia’s only links or stationing of military 
or other resources in Southeast Asia. By the end of the 1950s, the 
Australian commitment to Southeast Asia had in some part aligned to the 
US “with apparently beneficial results for the country’s prosperity and 
security”.129  While this was so, consistency in government at the highest 
levels in Australia needed to meet a different approach by its American 
partner. John F. Kennedy was associated with what has come to be 
known as flexible response, “moving forward in crises one step at a time, 
raising at each stage that pressure on opponents, probing their will, 
exploring opportunities for a settlement even while preparing to up the 
ante”.130 In fact, “where Kennedy really wanted flexible response was not 
at the nuclear or conventional levels, but with counterinsurgency. He 
disliked nuclear weapons and sought measures that would prevent them 
from being used”.131 This can be related to the broader aegis of the Cold 
War in Southeast Asia, and a superpower coming to embrace a different 
method of channelling its resources. The point was not the rejection of 
containment, but the application of force to different scenarios that 








subversion level, but the shift in focus of its most powerful member state 
implied that planning would emphasize this course more than others. In 
this sense, SEATO was always subject to the machinations of its member 
states. 
Laos, an Associated or Protocol State in the SEATO treaty, was 
characterized in the postwar period mainly by struggles between the 
leftists, the neutralists and the rightists, which “relentlessly struggled for 
power and dominance.”132 Unlike Cambodia, whose Prince Norodom 
Sihanouk “charted Cambodia’s neutralist course from the time of 
independence,” Prince Souvanna Phouma in Laos “even at his strongest 
he did not wield the kind of power that Cambodia’s leader did.”133 Lao 
political developments from 1954 to 1962, as Bruce Lockhart describes 
them, can be summarized in two phases. The first saw attempts to 
incorporate Pathet Lao forces into the Lao government and its army. A 
coalition was formed in 1957 when the Lao Cabinet briefly comprised 
Prince Souphanavong (the half-brother of Phouma) and other Pathet Lao 
leaders, before their arrest or escape. The second saw the rise of “an 
influential group of Rightists under General Phoumi Nosavan, who enjoyed 
the backing of the US military and CIA,” but this gave impetus to a more 
radical group of Neutralists under Kong Le, a colonel. A second coalition 








was launched by Kong Le, who with his Pathet Lao allies had a base 
supported and supplied by the Soviets, “both directly and via Vietnam.” 
The result of the events was well expressed by a British Cabinet 
Committee in 1960, that “the North Vietnamese threat to Laos and 
Vietnam is now the most immediate danger in the area”, and subversive 
elements could use the hills in Laos to move from North to South 
Vietnam.135 Growing subversion in the region found expression in the 
events unfolding in Laos, and SEATO had to act to give its deterrent 
credibility. In the absence of direct invasion, however, the subversive 
threat, and hence strategies that dealt with counter-subversion, came to 
the fore. 
 








Australian officials, assessing the situation, knew they had to come up 
with the forces to meet the threats. On 15 December 1959, the Australian 
Cabinet was briefed about potential military action in relation to the crisis 
in Laos, especially in terms of communist insurgency. Plan 5B under the 
Military Planning Office envisioned a SEATO force being introduced to help 
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the Laotian government deal with insurgency, and Cabinet had authorized 
the Australian military adviser, Admiral Roy Dowling, to support any US 
initiative in terms of this plan.137 Dowling spoke to his US counterpart, 
Admiral Harry Felt, during the SEATO meetings in September that year, 
when it was revealed to him that the US were prepared to “nominate 
substantial forces” under the plan. In the light of this, Dowling asked for: 
— Infantry battalion with supporting arms 
— Fighter squadron with appropriate air transport for the 
Australian force 
— Destroyers in support 
Cabinet approved this in late September, but with the important 
caveat that such a contribution need not equate to a military intervention 
in Laos, which had to be reviewed by the government in the future 
depending on the circumstances.138 During the SEATO military advisers 
conference, it was made clear that the operational plan was to support 
Laotian efforts, and to be seen to deter, and not merely present 
overwhelming force. But Australia appreciated the gravity of the situation, 
and was still willing to contribute to SEATO. The government ordered the 
Australian ambassador in Washington to communicate to the US State 
Department that Australia supported the need for SEATO preparedness, in 
the event of the failure of United Nations action in Laos, and that if 







military force), this should be under SEATO and not a unilateral US 
operation. In the event of a SEATO intervention, Australia would wish to 
participate in both the planning and the execution.139 
At that time, Joint Intelligence Committee estimates demonstrated 
a concern about Communist China instigating a North Vietnam attack, to 
test SEATO’s ability to react. Nuclear retaliation might be a deterrent 
against China in a possible scenario involving South Vietnam, but the 
issue was the credibility of the US guarantee to South Vietnam. This 
problematized Chinese involvement as a direct result of overt military 
aggression by North Vietnam, but such was only an appreciation, as it 
envisioned potential scenarios with plausible measurements of deterrent 
capabilities.140 In some sense mirroring SEATO’s development of plans, 
the deterrent capacity could be legitimate only in relative terms, and thus 
this meant that all appreciations were subject to the actions, capabilities 
and broader strategic objectives of the enemy. Westad notes that the 
battles waged in “Third World” areas during the Cold War “intensified the 
superpower conflict through international interventions and increased the 
cost of the competition, while destroying many of the societies in which 
the battles were carried out.”141 This thesis suggests that such destruction 
need not be actual (though it was in some instances), but the potential to 








Lamenting the problems of coordination in SEATO in 1960, planners 
noted that even in the Treaty Area, the SEATO idea had “never taken any 
deep root.” The report also noted that the Asian countries sought to use 
SEATO to secure aid, and as an insurance policy in foreign affairs. The 
lament went further that “probably only by Australia and perhaps New 
Zealand is SEATO regarded as a real preparation for war in which 
Australian troops may have to fight.” Apart from establishing closer 
relations with Thailand, Australian officials noted, the relevance of SEATO 
had waned. The American guarantee had become the most critical factor 
in trying to maintain consensus in the organization.142 
By 1961, SEATO military advisers agreed that the main purpose of a 
proposed force in responding to a Laotian request for assistance was to 
“maintain the morale of the Laotian forces and to increase their capacity 
to carry out effective operations”. This included logistics, psychological 
warfare and air support. In particular, Australian forces would be drawn in 
the air component, in both combat and transport roles.143 Assessing the 
political implications for Australian attitudes to military intervention, a 
report acknowledged the US potential to propose intervention through 
SEATO but noted that Australia’s “failure to support collective SEATO 
action would not only tend to influence the United Kingdom and New 
Zealand against it, but would also have a discouraging effect on Asian 






would result.”144 Such an existential point was not lost at the time, nor 
has it been lost on scholars studying the organization. Pearson, who dealt 
with the New Zealand role in SEATO, put it clearly: “SEATO’s failure to 
respond effectively [in Laos] led to the partial collapse of political 
cooperation in the alliance.”145 It was also noted that, like the earlier point 
about an evolving situation requiring modifications of earlier plans, the 
insurgents, into 1961, “are now organized on a more formal military 
basis … the Laotian Government is now faced not only with Communist 
insurgency but also a ‘neutralist’ revolt under Kong Le (now integrated 
with the Pathet Lao) and a falling off in political support.”146 
While the consensus was eventually lost, this was not the only 
platform in organizational planning where intentions diverged in planning 
against common scenarios. The Military Planning Office may have 
advocated Plan 5, but the Committee of Security Experts on many 
occasions pointed out the lack of alignment between political and military 
objectives.147 It was also becoming clear that subversion was spreading in 
mainland Southeast Asia. Plan 5 may have envisaged a military-type 
intervention in Laos, but did not cover events elsewhere. Here the idea of 
the Cold War as beyond the control of planners is seen in how planners 
tried to control and manage its spread. SEATO developed Plan 8 in 









the country.”148 Interestingly, when developing one form of this plan, 
Thailand rejected a draft of Plan 8/63, suggesting it did not require SEATO 
military assistance but rather in the form of civic action. This had serious 
implications for developmental and political legitimacy, especially because 
the aid Thailand envisioned would be “economic and development aid for 
those areas of strategic concern, such as the north-east of Thailand”, but 
this was only after the failure of military intervention in Laos, when, as 
Fenton suggests, “SEATO as a whole, had taken a battering.”149 
It would be wrong to assume that plans other than Plan 5 were 
discarded in the wake of the crisis in Laos. In fact, overlaps with other 
plans meant Australian planners had to allocate resources and manage 
defence obligations. In one instance, in terms of ANZAM planning and the 
use of bomber forces in SEATO operations from bases in Butterworth and 
Tengah, Australian, UK and New Zealand forces operated from Plan 4 and 
6 scenarios, even in 1962. They saw that even a threat to the security of 
the bases need not compromise the security of the area, and this was 
helped by an appreciation that in “the present Chinese Communist Order-
of-Battle there appears to be little likelihood of an appreciable air threat 
developing against Butterworth and even less against Singapore”, until 
about 1964.150 As has been seen, the plans covering SEATO intervention 








on the ground. South Vietnam fell directly into the ambit of communist 
insurgency, if not direct invasion from North Vietnam. 
Australian Joint Intelligence Committee considerations of possible 
SEATO or US intervention in South Vietnam included the problems of 
countering covert intervention by the North, and the deliberations give us 
a good indication, in a handwritten note from 1961, as to the problem at 
hand:  
What from the military point of view would be the requirements of 
successful action? How many troops? What would be their roles? 
Would we have to take over direction of South Vietnamese 
intelligence (this may be the key to success)? Answers to these 
questions are important not only for their own sake but because the 
scale and nature of Western intervention will have important (text 
unclear) on nature of DRV reaction…151 
 
Here again, the legitimacy of potential action in the eyes of Asian 
states was not lost on the planners. For example, “the Indians are torn 
between their desire to prevent a Communist victory in South Vietnam 
and their inability to align themselves with the West to prevent it.”152 
Australian officials continued to be concerned with Asian opinion, and this 
linked with prior objectives to integrate and manage the agendas of newly 
independent countries, but this could only go so far. The implementation 
in times that demanded numerous responsibilities to be distributed with 
limited resources was a challenge. 
The contiguity of terrain and its use by subversive elements posed a 







intelligence understood this point, especially in its appreciation of the 
influence of the North Vietnamese in places such as Laos, through use of 
access routes as well. But this did not mean that involvement of 
Communist China was a fait accompli. In fact, in one appreciation in 1961, 
it was seen that “it is unlikely that Communist China would react violently 
unless she decided that her national interests were involved.”153 It was 
clear to Australian officials that a broader strategic landscape eclipsed 
insurgent intentions and capabilities, and that intervention had 
consequences and was not always a guarantee, especially with the major 
communist powers. This can be also seen in a note on the situation in 
South Vietnam in January 1962, that the “Viet Cong will probably step up 
their operations but would probably be restrained — particularly by the 
USSR — from all-out attacks,” considering that US large-scale 
intervention would follow, among other factors.154 
It would be problematic to intervene in scenarios of fluctuation, and 
if variables such as potential Geneva settlements to decide the fate of 
Laos were interrupted by intervention. Planners had to tread carefully, 
and this meant balancing aspirations towards supporting an amicable 
settlement while facing a possible accusation that a neutral government 
was subject to territorial intervention by the US and SEATO. This would 
have consequences not just for the appearance of legitimacy but for the 






such a scenario could be met by willing aid donors from the Communist 
bloc.155 While this was so, and while Australia wanted to focus on 
legitimate action, “Cabinet decided that Australia would be prepared to 
participate in a military intervention in Laos under United States 
leadership, preferably in a SEATO context,” on three separate occasions, 
September 1959, March and May 1961.156 
This should not imply that the Australians were inevitably drawn to 
US intentions and actions and had somehow departed from their 
alternative obligations — thus demonstrating that overlaps continued as a 
pertinent force. How many troops they could contribute on the ground 
had to take into account existing force guarantees, such as through 
ANZAM. Not least because it might need to deploy forces stationed in 
Malaysia and Singapore to potential scenarios involving Laos, this had 
implications for Australia and broader British Defence Coordinating 
Committee (Far East) policy, which in October 1959 created a plan, 
Buckram, to meet the demands of the 28 Commonwealth Brigade 
contribution to Laos. One statement by Australian planners put it rather 
well, that coordinating and maintaining obligations with the British could 
become embarrassing if “United Kingdom’s political decision were against 
repeat against intervention.”157 A greater voice for Australia did not mean 
abandoning its traditional interests, but it did lead to a search for other 







A loss of territory could lead to “the subversion of Indonesia, leaving 
communism ‘at the very threshold of our northern door’.”158 Karl Hack 
puts Australia’s dilemma of balancing commitments well: Its growing faith 
in SEATO “increasingly meant taking a separate, though preferably not 
conflicting line with Britain.”159 
The neutralization of Laos was a classic case of divisions among 
allies of the same camp. Divergences over the approach to Communist 
China mirrored the divergence between a superpower with growing 
challenges, the US, and a declining great power, the UK, in trying to 
manage this common challenge. In all fairness, this divergence did not 
lead to a complete parting of the ways, but instead manifested itself in 
diplomacy that found conciliation through common platforms, such as 
SEATO, problematic. Here, overlaps and timing took a different form: that 
of two different approaches to managing a changing regional situation. 
The UK “was anxious to avoid a war it might have to take part and might 
become a wider war,” and so saw neutralization as possibly a template for 
a states system solution to the crisis. For the US, a statement by 
Secretary of State Dean Rusk embodies the position well, in terms of not 
replicating the Laos settlement in Vietnam, “friendly and United States 
public opinion would not accept this; isolationism would increase. NATO 
allies have questioned our resolve on Laos. Laos is a bad precedent.”160 






either. The settlement in Laos depended on a legitimate resolution, but 
the use of terminologies, evident since Geneva in 1954, played out once 
again, as “the North Vietnamese did not feel bound by the provision 
against using Laos for interfering in the affairs of another state because 
they regarded North and South Vietnam as one state”.161 The two news 
clippings below demonstrate the mood in Australian journalism in early 
1962, by two prominent voices reporting the region to a national audience, 
Denis Warner and Richard Hughes: 
 
Fig 4. News Clippings on the Fate of SEATO, March 1962162 
 
 
SEATO’s growing pains had serious implications for Australian motivations, 
yet they did not cripple Australian defence priorities, or deter Australia 
from pursuing the broader objective to maintain forward defence as a 





developments in this period, especially in 1962. The key here is the Rusk-
Thanat agreement, of 6 March 1962, which “permitted the United States 
to undertake unilateral action under the treaty without reference to the 
then existing treaty organization ….” While Buszynski indicates that this 
was not the end of SEATO, and actually reinforced the fact that 
agreement among allies was not as important as ability to act through its 
provisions, this allusion to symbolic action did not negate the pressing 
need to determine a course in the face of consensus breaking down.163 
While Southeast Asia was a strategic priority, it was not Australia’s only 
international commitment. Compounding the problem of consensus in 
SEATO was growing disenchantment in the UK and France, and the 
growing US need to assert its anti-communist credentials with force in 
Indochina. 
Especially in this period, timing and commitments came to the fore 
for Australians. At the highest levels, a growing need to align itself with 
the American efforts in the region was met with the “inadequacies of 
Australian defence resources to meet the growing number of crises in 
Southeast Asia.” While Cabinet in Australia saw that a potential force 
commitment to Vietnam was better channelled through the use of a 
SEATO force, because of the need to display its commitment to political 
legitimacy “it did not wish to be part of a conflict in Asia ‘which would be 
almost exclusively between white and coloured’, and noted that forces 




enter.”164 Legitimacy was the thread that tied together the imperatives of 
timeliness and overlaps; it was pursued even in the face of major 
alterations to collective security agreements; and it was used to bolster 
an active commitment while still retaining a cautious approach that was 
inclusive. 
The growing emphasis on other strategic objectives did not mean a 
departure from Australia’s role in SEATO. It continued to contribute to 
various schemes at civilian and military levels. One example of civilian 
contribution was in education. Detailed records were kept on 
professorships, such as a SEATO professorship in Organic Chemistry at 
the University of Medical Science in Bangkok. Professor D.E. White, an 
Australian academic specializing in the field, applied for this. The 
application was forwarded to relevant national authorities, in this case the 
Department of External Affairs in Canberra, and they made comments as 
they saw fit.165 Political conflicts over members and their roles in the 
organization could also spill into the realm of cultural activities. In a 
handwritten note on a proposed exhibition of Muslim art in Australia, 
officials pointed out that this could not just reinforce ties with Southeast 
Asia, but also address criticisms by Thailand, the Philippines and Pakistan 
that “there is not enough support from the non-Asian SEATO members for 







Nicholas Tarling’s framework of neutralization, neutralism and 
neutrality acts as a prosthesis to help us understand the numerous 
challenges to sovereignty, and by extension legitimacy, in this period, but 
it does not include all the factors at play.167 The link is counterinsurgency 
as a complicating factor in the Cold War in the region, with special 
reference to growing US focus on this. This was, as Blaufarb notes, not 
limited to the region, but in the eyes of its principal foe “the Soviet 
premier himself [Khrushchev] made the point, citing Cuba, Vietnam, and 
Algeria as current examples of just wars.”168 Willy-nilly the broader aegis 
gave Australia a global set of responsibilities with a direct focus on 
securing its shores by dealing with Southeast Asia. This also meant 
dealing with other territorial claims not related to the broader ideological 
currents of the time, but to older colonial and post-colonial claims. One 
instance was New Guinea, where in 1959, in the House of Representatives, 
Menzies said Australia must recognize Dutch sovereignty based on its 
prior recognition. Menzies, particularly astute in legal reasoning, declared 
that Australia should support such a claim against Indonesia in the 
interest of the indigenous population and self-determination.169 The issue 
was that Indonesia’s attempt to impose control had national security 
implications for Australia. These may have meant a possibility of 








scenario envisioned over “conflict with Indonesia over West New Guinea 
or a limited war with Indonesia while American and other SEATO forces 
were fully engaged elsewhere”.170 West New Guinea threatened to cause 
a strain on Australian and American relations, but the relationship with 






The debacle in Laos ended without a fixed solution to the problem of 
subversion in Southeast Asia after 1962. In fact, SEATO plans in the same 
years, for instance towards Thailand, highlighted the remaining threat of 
subversion to compromise the legitimacy of governments in the region. 
Australian planners used SEATO to grow determination to meet the threat 
posed by communist aggression, but plans could work only if there was 
consensus. The loss of consensus over Plan 5 and the neutralization of 
Laos, with the Rusk-Thanat Agreement in 1962, meant that SEATO could 
not put into action its military plans to deter if not defeat communist 
threats to the area. This was not the end of the organization, but it 
underscored a growing need for Australian planners to focus on other 
means to achieve forward defence. Menzies and others were convinced 




seven-year breathing space,171 but developments did not stand still. 
Growing concerns over the territorial integrity of South Vietnam and a 
shift towards a broader American commitment via its strategic imperative 
of flexible response meant that SEATO as a deterrent could not be the 
only option. But options to avoid a singular defence guarantee were 
manifold. This, alas, bore out the lessons of the failure of the Singapore 
strategy — but did not imply divergence from planning beside 
Commonwealth partners, or even the UK. SEATO became a means to an 
end, but the broader principle of legitimacy as an organizing factor in the 
political and military sense remained a priority for Australia in the region 
and more broadly. Laos, and by extension the Cold War in Southeast Asia, 
can be seen as a metaphor for situations radically altering and even 









The narrative of Australian involvement in SEATO, and by extension its 




Southeast Asian region, between 1954 and 1962, is telling in four broad 
respects. First, by employing an empirical approach, one can evaluate, 
from declassified source material, the role of an actor in a position 
between finding and building independent capabilities, but also leveraging 
different means to engage great powers to advance its own interests. 
Second, it provides an insight into the workings of a security alliance that 
brings together divergent interests, and shows it is not inevitable that 
powers so arranged are by implication in an asymmetrical relationship. 
Third, it demonstrates the complex interaction between decolonization 
and the Cold War, and shows how powers tried to meet threats at 
different levels, especially to deter communist aggression. Fourth, it 
allows a scholar to make a historiographical contribution to scholarship on 
the Cold War, that brings to light hitherto “peripheral” areas. The focus on 
a periphery, in this case, does not destabilize the bipolar structure of the 
ideological struggle the conflict came to embody. It does, however, tell us 
how ideology interacted with other priorities, and the examination of 
grand strategy when there was technically no global conflict of the 
intensity of a total war can still show how players dealt with other forms 
of conflicts, and mobilised the tools of statecraft to meet the ends of 
forward defence. 
Australia sought to leverage on its great power allies and other 
partners through collective security agreements after the Second World 
War, especially ANZUS, ANZAM and SEATO, but these were not exclusive 
zones of interest. Nor were they the only means, complemented by an 
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agenda of development, such as through the Colombo Plan. Australia 
found consensus and cooperation key to its own interests, but could also 
bring in great power involvement, as well as complement its own resource 
limitations. These limitations did not deter Australian planners from 
pursuing their agenda in Southeast Asia. This was partly because of the 
need to commit resources to gain a place in inner circles that comprised 
the US, UK and New Zealand, and to maintain traditional links, especially 
through its commitments in ANZAM. But Australians genuinely wanted to 
pursue an inclusive agenda, to a degree, of bringing Asian voices into the 
organization that was to become SEATO. This concern with inclusiveness 
did not deter Australia from pursuing military effectiveness through 
different machinery and its commitments to its allies. Whether supporting 
development or later military efforts in South Vietnam, the US 
“recognized the value of working with Australia.”172 
Australia’s interest in legitimising its role in SEATO and promoting 
legitimacy through the organization meant it needed to focus on 
timeliness and allocate resources by overlapping commitments. The 
balance between the two was not always easy. Australia sought to build 
SEATO’s capabilities, but knew this would depend on commitment by 
other powers to the organization and the creation of structures to support 
its growing responsibilities. Through the Military Planning Office, the 
Council, civil activities and security experts, Australia contributed to 




problem of disparate capabilities, especially in intelligence, between the 
great powers and Asian members. This relates back to concerns about 
sharing information among all members, with early suspicions about the 
reliability of Asian states in this regard. 
SEATO’s structures and civilian political and military representatives 
standardized its operating procedures, and so it was able to present a 
capable working organization. However, capabilities depended on 
constituent members, and consensus was the driving force to turn 
capabilities into coordinated action. This was complicated by the conflicts 
of the Cold War in the region, as well as divergence in the interests of 
member states. But these differences already existed while SEATO was 
being formed, when the US signed a special reservation on its 
understanding of aggression. Underlying factors became reinforced by 
changing realities, that stressed the divergence between the US and the 
UK over approaches to sovereignty, especially because the US had not 
been privy to the Geneva Agreements of 1954, while the UK, as a 
chairman, sought to continue to play such a role. Australia sought to tie 
together its big power guarantors through SEATO, which allowed it to 
forward its defence imperatives without abandoning prior arrangements in 
ANZUS and ANZAM. SEATO also allowed it to integrate and reinforce 
commitments to prior arrangements, notably in its defence of Malaya. 
This presented opportunities of force allocation, but also tensions due to 
the use of forces in potential SEATO Plan 5 scenarios that was not 
welcomed by the nationalist and newly independent Malayan government. 
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Australia pursued the development of legitimacy to reinforce 
forward defence, but understandings of legitimacy, especially in terms of 
subversion and communist aggression, posed challenges to SEATO and 
Australian commitment to the organization. Subversion as a problem 
meant developing plans that were viable under SEATO, which comprised 
both development and propaganda efforts, as well as policing measures, 
alongside military intervention. But the growth of the subversive threat, 
with SEATO’s failure to implement Plan 5 in Laos, its counter-insurgency 
plan, meant the deterrent value of the organization itself was put into 
question. The shift towards more bilateral security arrangements, 
especially the US agreement with Thailand in 1962, did not negate or 
nullify SEATO, but did shift emphasis away from it as a principal 
instrument to meet threats in the region, towards other solutions. 
Australian planners were not paralysed by such a shift, but had to work to 
meet the demands of the situation in a timely fashion, to continue to 
meet its strategic objectives. 
Consistency in a defence and foreign policy objective did not lend 
coherence to the events and situations that planners faced. After all, 
Australian intentions were only one factor in a situation with many 
variables. But orthodox scholarship on SEATO, best represented by the 
work of Buszynski,173 which implied that the organization was ineffective 
because it could not meet the threats it set out to meet, lacks a more 




attention, especially when declassified documents reveal an attempt to 
build deterrent capacity in a number of ways. Political and military 
legitimacy pursued by Australian officials through SEATO meant 
addressing situations that were less than coherent. Continuity in 
administration had an effect on this, especially the long-serving coalition 
under Menzies. But continuity should not suggest overwhelming 
consensus. Actions taken needed to be justified to the Australian people, 
through parliament and other means. The use of force could not be 
applied without first being linked to appropriate goals. Personalities such 
as Shedden, Casey and Barwick, along with Tange and others, 
demonstrated the vitality of the personal touch in the highest levels of 
government, so vividly illustrated by Evatt in the immediate postwar 
years. However, this vitality was constrained by a growing level of 
bureaucratic coherence. By 1962, Australian officials were active players 
in the global arena, even more so in Southeast Asia. One could almost be 
surprised to learn that in the first half of the 20th century, Australian 
foreign policy can be read as a “proto-policy”,174 especially compared with 
the energy with which it pursued its goals from after the war to 1962. But 
this should not be equated with Australian predominance in global affairs, 
nor should it suggest a preponderance of regional influence. Australia was 
caught amid the spectre of ideological struggles, the rise of nationalism, 
and attempts to deter communist aggression when it sought to promote 




global affairs. It did so with a careful but principled approach, and 
pursued a course which emphasized its own security. SEATO was but one 
path that formed the overall course, and thus a shift of emphasis away 






























The parties to this treaty, 
§ Recognizing the sovereign equality of all the parties. 
§ Reiterating their faith in the purposes and principles set forth in the 
Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with 
all peoples and all Governments, 
§ Reaffirming that, in accordance with the Charter of the United 
Nations, they uphold the principle of equal rights and self-
determination of peoples, and declaring that they will earnestly 
strive by every peaceful means to promote self-government and to 
secure the independence of all countries whose peoples desire it 
and are able to undertake its responsibilities, 
§ Desiring to strengthen the fabric of peace and freedom and to 
uphold the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule 
of law, and to promote the economic well-being and development 
of all peoples in the treaty area, 
§ Intending to declare publicly and formally their sense of unity, so 
that any potential aggressor will appreciate that the parties stand 
together in the area, and 
§ Desiring further to co-ordinate their efforts for collective defence for 
the preservation of peace and security, 
Therefore, agree as follows: 
Article 1 
The parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, 
to settle any international disputes, in which they may be involved, by 
peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security 
and justice are not endangered, and to refrain in their international 
relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with 





In order more effectively to achieve the objective of this treaty, the 
parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-
help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and 
collective capacity to resist armed attack and to prevent and counter 
subversive activities directed from without against their territorial 
integrity and political stability. 
Article 3 
The parties undertake to strengthen their free institutions and to co-
operate with one another in the further development of economic 
measures, including technical assistance, designed both to promote 
economic progress and social well-being and to further the individual and 
collective efforts of governments towards these ends. 
Article 4 
1. Each party recognizes that aggression by means of armed attack 
in the treaty area against any of the parties or against any state 
or territory which the parties by unanimous agreement may 
hereafter designate, would endanger its own peace and safety, 
and agrees that it will in that event act to meet the common 
danger in accordance with its constitutional processes. Measures 
taken under this paragraph shall be immediately reported to the 
Security Council of the United Nations. 
2. If, in the opinion of any of the parties, the inviolability or the 
integrity of the territory or the sovereignty or political 
independence of any party in the treaty area or of any other state 
or territory to which the provisions of Paragraph I of this Article 
from time to time apply is threatened in any way other than by 
armed attack or is affected or threatened by any fact or situation 
which might endanger the peace of the area, the parties shall 
consult immediately in order to agree on the measures which 
would be taken for the common defence. 
3. It is understood that no action on the territory of any state 
designated by unanimous agreement under Paragraph I of this 
Article or on any territory so designated shall be taken except at 
the invitation or with the consent of the government concerned. 
Article 5 
The parties hereby establish a council, on which each of them shall be 
represented, to consider matters concerning the implementation of this 
treaty. The council shall provide for consultation with regard to military 
and any other planning as the situation obtaining in the treaty area may 
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from time to time require. The council shall be so organized as to be able 
to meet at any time. 
Article 6 
This treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any 
way the rights and obligations of any of the parties under the Charter of 
the United Nations or the responsibility of the United Nations for the 
maintenance of international peace and security. Each party declares that 
none of the international engagements now in force between it and any 
other of the parties or any third party is in conflict with the provisions of 
this treaty, and undertakes not to enter into any international 
engagement in conflict with this treaty. 
Article 7 
Any other state in a position to further the objectives of this treaty and to 
contribute to the security of the area may, by unanimous agreement of 
the parties, be invited to accede to this treaty. Any state so invited may 
become a party to the treaty by depositing its instrument of accession 
with the Government of the Republic of the Philippines. The Government 
of the Republic of the Philippines shall inform each of the parties of the 
deposit of each such instrument of accession. 
Article 8 
As used in this treaty, the “treaty area” is the general area of Southeast 
Asia, including also the entire territories of the Asian parties, and the 
general area of the Southwest Pacific not including the Pacific area north 
of 21 degrees 30 minutes north latitude. The parties may, by unanimous 
agreement, amend this Article to include within the treaty area the 
territory of any state acceding to this treaty in accordance with Article 7 
or otherwise to change the treaty area. 
Article 9 
1. This treaty shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of 
the Republic of the Philippines. Duly certified copies thereof shall 
be transmitted by that Government to the other signatories. 
2. The treaty shall be ratified and its provisions carried out by the 
parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. 
The instruments of ratification shall be deposited as soon as 
possible with the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, 
which shall notify all of the other signatories of such deposit. 
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3. The treaty shall enter into force between the states which have 
ratified it as soon as the instruments of ratification of a majority of 
the signatories shall have been deposited, and shall come into 
effect with respect to each other state on the date of the deposit 
of its instrument of ratification. 
Article 10 
This treaty shall remain in force indefinitely, but any party may cease to 
be a party one year after its notice of denunciation has been given to the 
Government of the Republic of the Philippines, which shall inform the 
Governments of the other parties of the deposit of each notice of 
denunciation. 
Article 11 
The English text of this treaty is binding on the parties, but when the 
parties have agreed to the French text thereof and have so notified the 
Government of the Republic of the Philippines, the French text shall be 
equally authentic and binding on the parties. 
Understanding of U.S.A. 
The United States of America in executing the present treaty does so with 
the understanding that its recognition of the effect of aggression and 
armed attack and its agreement with reference thereto in Article 4, 
Paragraph I, apply only to communist aggression but affirms that in the 
event of the aggression or armed attack it will consult under the 
provisions of Article 4, paragraph 2. 
Done at Manila eighth day of September, 1954. [The treaty was signed by 
the principal members of all eight delegations at the Conference.] 
The Protocol 
Designation of states and territory as to which provisions of Article 4 and 
Article 3 are to be applicable: 
§ The parties to the Southeast Asia Collective Defence Treaty 
unanimously designate for the purpose of Article 4 of the treaty the 
states of Cambodia and Laos and the free territory under the 
jurisdiction of the state of Vietnam. The parties further agree that 
the above mentioned states and territory shall be eligible in respect 
of the economic measures contemplated by Article 3. 
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This protocol shall come into force simultaneously with the coming into 
force of the treaty. 
In witness whereof the undersigned plenipotentiaries have signed this 
protocol to the Southeast Asia Collective Defence Treaty. 
Done at Manila eighth day of September, 1954. 
The Pacific Charter 
The delegates of the United States, Great Britain, France, Australia, New 
Zealand, Pakistan, Thailand and the Philippines, 
§ Desiring to establish a firm basis for common action to maintain 
peace and security in Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific; 
§ Convinced that common action to this end, in order to be worthy 
and effective, must be inspired by the highest principles of justice 
and liberty; 
Do hereby proclaim: 
§ First, in accordance with provisions of the United Nations Charter, 
they uphold the principle of equal rights and self-determination of 
peoples, and they will earnestly strive by every peaceful means to 
promote the self-government and to secure the independence of all 
countries whose peoples desire in and are able to undertake its 
responsibilities; 
§ Second, they are each prepared to continue taking effective 
practical measures to ensure conditions favourable to the orderly 
achievement of the foregoing purposes in accordance with their 
constitutional processes; 
§ Third, they will continue to co-operate in the economic, social and 
cultural fields in order to promote higher living standards, 
economic progress and social well-being in this region; 
§ Fourth, as declared in the Southeast Asia Collective Defence Treaty, 
they are determined to prevent or counter by appropriate means 
any attempt in the treaty area to subvert their freedom or to 
destroy their sovereignty or territorial integrity. Proclaimed at 




SEATO Operational Plans 1956-1965 
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Source: Fenton, Damien. To Cage the Red Dragon: SEATO and the 
Defence of Southeast Asia, 1955-1965. Singapore: NUS Press, 




















Map 1. French Indochina.  
Source: Logevall, Fredrik. Embers of War: the Fall of an Empire 





Map 2. Southeast Asia 1955-1965. 
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Source: Fenton, Damien. To Cage the Red Dragon: SEATO and the 
Defence of Southeast Asia, 1955-1965. Singapore: NUS Press, 
2012, p.xi. 
 
Map 3. BDCC and ANZAM Areas in the Early 1950s. 
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Source: Hack, Karl. Defence and Decolonization in Southeast Asia: 
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